The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1316. Sir Peter Ricketts told the Inquiry that the state of US planning had been “one of a

number of concerns as the peace process ended and the conflict loomed”.555 He added:

“I do think, if the careful State Department work had been allowed to feed through

into operational planning for the post-conflict phase, that would have been more

successful. I think it would have been easier for us to dock with it, and the overall

effect on the ground would … have been a stronger operation from earlier on.”556

1317. A number of witnesses to the Inquiry commented on the difficulty the UK

faced in trying to influence the US.

1318. Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that Mr Blair:

“… was insistent throughout that a lot of thought needed to be given to what

happened on what has been called ‘the morning after’. He raised that with the

President. This was raised by, I think, most British interlocutors with their American

interlocutors.

“I don’t think I could say to you that that was a condition in the end when the UN

route failed for military action, but it was certainly something that was important

to him.”557

1319. Sir David also told the Inquiry:

“The Prime Minister throughout is very clear that there has to be a clever plan

afterwards, the UN have to be involved, and you can’t do this simply as a military

operation.

“The second thing he is absolutely insistent … [on] is the Middle East peace

process.

“So I think he is very clear that it isn’t just a military operation, but getting the

American machine to respond to this proves to be enormously difficult.”558

1320. Sir David added:

“I don’t know whether the Prime Minister discussed a blueprint for Iraq – I don’t

think he did, I don’t recall it – with the President. He might have done in his private

conversations. But insisting that they had to think about what came next, insisting

on the importance of having the UN in there, he was very clear about that. And

I suppose the fact that the Americans were doing a lot of planning for Iraq was a

reassurance to him.”559

555 Public hearing, 1 December 2009, pages 59-60.

556 Public hearing, 1 December 2009, page 92.

557 Public hearing, 30 November 2009, page 41.

558 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 42-43.

559 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, page 58.

544