The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… well
established that the authorisation to use force given by the
Security Council
in 1990 may
be revived if the Council decides that there has been a
sufficiently
serious
breach of the conditions laid down by the Council for the
cease-fire.
“In the
resolution we have just adopted, the Council has condemned the
Iraqi
decision to
cease all co-operation as a flagrant violation of its
obligations.
“This
resolution sends a clear message to Iraq: resume co-operation now.
If Iraq
does so,
the Council has spelt out unambiguously that it stands ready to
conduct
a
comprehensive review of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations …
and what
steps
remain to be taken. We hope that Iraq will respond positively and
resume full
co‑operation
soon.”
607.
Mr Peter
Burleigh, US Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, stated
that
the Council
had “sent a clear and unmistakable message to Iraq” that
“non-compliance
will not be
rewarded or tolerated”. The restrictions which Iraq had imposed on
UNSCOM
and the
IAEA were “intolerable”. Mr Annan had “expressed his own view”
that Iraq’s
decision of
31 October was a “serious breach and major violation” of the
23 February
MOU.
President Clinton and Secretary Albright had “emphasized that all
options are
on the
table”, and the US had “the authority to act”.
608.
Mr Burleigh
concluded:
“Iraq
should recognise the gravity of the situation it has created. Iraq
must turn back
from the
dangerous and self-defeating course it has chosen. The United
States
sincerely
hopes that Iraq will heed the clear message of this resolution and
take the
necessary
steps without delay.”
609.
On the evening
of 10 November, Mr Butler decided to remove all
UNSCOM
personnel
from Iraq.243
He stated,
in a letter to the President of the Security Council
the
following
day, that the “prime consideration which motivated the decision,
and the speed
at which it
was executed, was the safety of the Commission’s staff”. He had
consulted
the
President of the Security Council, Dr ElBaradei and the Chilean
Acting Permanent
Representative
to the UN in New York. “Discussions were also held” with
Mr Annan’s
office.
Mr Butler regretted that it had not been possible to hold
wider consultations.
610.
In his memoir,
Mr Annan recounts learning of UNSCOM’s withdrawal through
a
telephone
call from Dr ElBaradei at 0330 on the morning of 11 November
and his anger
at what he
considered to be Mr Butler’s “deeply unprofessional
behaviour”.244
243
UN Security
Council, 11 November 1998, ‘Letter dated 11 November 1998
from the Executive
Chairman of
the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph
9 (b) (i)
of Security council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the
President of the Security Council’
(S/1998/1059).
244
Annan
K. Interventions:
A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane,
2012.
138