8 | The
invasion
401.
In discussion,
the Ad Hoc Meeting noted that the
welcome given to British troops
entering
Basra had been covered in very different ways by different
television channels.
The looting
of regime premises should not be permitted to degenerate into
general
lawlessness.
It was likely to be difficult to assure the civil police function
as the Iraqi
police had
in the past been closely associated with the regime’s apparatus of
repression.
402.
Mr Prescott
concluded that the conduct of UK forces in assuming control
of
Basra had
been commendable. Opportunities to conduct interviews with
scientists
who had
been engaged on Iraq’s WMD programmes should be “pursued when
the
fighting stopped”.
403.
The Chiefs of
Staff were informed on 8 April that the troops clearing the old
city
area had
been “met by a jubilant population”.244
404.
Mr Blair
and President Bush made a joint statement at Hillsborough on 8
April
setting out
the Coalition’s intentions for the future of Iraq, which is set out
in Section 9.1.
405.
A report
that evening
stated: “The situation in the city [Basra] has stabilised
…
although
looting will remain a problem until normal policing is
restored.” 245
406.
The overnight
report from COBR on 8/9 April informed Sir David Manning
that
Maj Gen
Brims had identified a potential local leader in Basra “with whom
he can do
business”
and had begun the process of establishing a Joint
Commission.246
Looting
was “not
as bad as reported in the media”.
407.
Adm Boyce
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 9 April that, in Basra,
UK
forces
would be lowering their profile by withdrawing some of the heavy
armour.247
The Commander
had also started the process of establishing a Joint Commission
which
should help
to restore order locally. Looting “was reducing, in part because of
Iraqi
self‑policing.”
408.
Ms Short was
concerned about the looting of humanitarian supplies and
water
plant in
the South. In discussion, it was noted that looting in Basra was
more isolated
than some
media suggested; and that the development of a civil policing
capability was
a
priority.
409.
In his
post-operation tour report, Maj Gen Brims wrote:
“…
collaborative planning, often led by 7 Armd Bde, was conducted to
develop
a concept
for the entry into [Basra]. The order was published on 6
[April],
coincidentally
at the same time as the opportunity was seized by 7 Armd
Bde.
The opportunity
was created by a JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munition, a
GPS-guided
244
Minutes, 8
April 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
245
Briefing
[MOD], 8 April 2003, ‘Annex to Evening Sitrep 8 April 2003:
Military’.
246
Minute
Gibbons to Manning, 9 April 2003, ‘Iraq: COBR Overnight Sitrep 8/9
April’.
247
Minutes, 9
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
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