The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
showed that
“two thirds of the civilians killed in the last six months died as
a result of
120.
Mr Straw
said that he had not seen those figures.86
121.
An MOD
official provided a contribution to the FCO’s response to No.10
on
13 October.87
The MOD
official confirmed that the MOD did not estimate
civilian
casualties
because it believed that there was no reliable method for doing so,
adding:
“This is
not merely our public line but our genuine judgement.”
122.
The official
dismissed the suggestion, made by the FCO, that the civilian
casualty
figures
that were reported to the weekly Chiefs of Staff meeting could
serve as a reliable
estimate of
total civilian casualties. Those figures were compiled by the US
based on
incomplete
“reporting of incidents” to US Corps HQ. The figures were reported
to Chiefs
of Staff as
trends in them indicated whether the security situation was
improving or
deteriorating.
123.
The official
concluded by re‑stating:
“… the MOD
does not produce an estimate of civilian casualties, either
within
our own
area of operation or across Iraq. We have no methodology which
would
enable us
to do this; nor do we believe it possible to define a methodology
that
would
produce figures meaningful enough to alleviate No.10’s concern
about public
presentation.”
124.
The FCO
replied to No.10 on 14 October, having consulted UK advisers in
the
Iraqi
MOH.88
The FCO
recommended that the UK should not take any ownership
of
figures of
civilian casualties; none of the estimates available were reliable,
and the UK
Government
would have difficulty in defending the methodology behind them to
the
media and
Parliament.
125.
The UK would
also have difficulty in compiling its own statistics:
“We rarely
have our own people on the ground following terrorist attacks,
often
relying on
press statistics. But their figures result in widely varying
estimates …”
126.
The FCO
advised that it regarded hospital and mortuary admissions collated
by
the Iraqi
MOH as the “most reliable” figures available, although there were a
number
of deficiencies:
•
Monthly and
six‑monthly MOH reports were not consistent.
85
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 12
October 2004, column 160.
86
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 12
October 2004, column 162.
87
Minute MOD
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 13 October 2004,
[untitled].
88
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 14 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualty
Figures’; Minute FCO
[junior official]
to Owen,
13 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualty Figures’.
192