3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
298.
Following
his minute of 3 July and a visit to Washington on 18 and 19
July,
Sir Kevin
Tebbit advised that the US Administration as a whole was
increasingly
united in
the view that military action would be taken against Iraq to bring
about
regime
change and remove WMD risks.
299.
Sir Kevin
reported that he had been left with an air of unreality given
the
enormity of
what was envisaged and the absence of a policy framework
and
detailed
planning.
300.
Sir Kevin
also commented that the UK’s conditions were “listened to
politely,
but without
enthusiasm or full agreement”. The US preparations for a
potential
invasion
did not yet meet the UK’s conditions for success.
301.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit visited Washington on 18 to 19 July. The telegram
from
Washington
reporting the visit described:
“A
harder-edged, more deliberative US view on regime change – though
they
acknowledge
the scale of the challenge. They appear intent on building a
strategic
rationale
for removing Saddam, and show scant interest in pursuing further
the
UN [inspections]
track. Tebbit explains the need to build a solid case first, to
ensure
that the UN
route has been exhausted, and to think through the implications
for
302.
No one had
disputed the need to make a strong international case
first.
Some senior
Americans had argued that the case needed to be presented in
“strategic
non-Iraq
specific terms – the US (and … others) having concluded that the
existential
threat of
WMD necessitated – and justified – military action to remove it.
Once set in
this
framework, the need for pre-emptive action against Iraq ought to be
understood
and accepted.”
303.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit also wrote to Sir David Manning before the Ministerial
discussion
on 23
July.
304.
Sir Kevin
reported: “The principal conclusion to be drawn is that the
Administration
as a whole
is increasingly united in the view that military action will be
taken against
Iraq to
bring about regime change and remove WMD risks.” That included the
State
Department
“notwithstanding its views on the difficulties”. The UK’s “points
about
shaping
public opinion, constructing coalitions, easing the
Israel/Palestine crisis and
exhausting
the UN inspectorate route were listened to politely, but without
enthusiasm
or full
agreement”. There was “no clear indication about timing” but one
American had
said that
the betting was for an operation in early 2003.
122
Telegram
970 Washington to FCO London, 20 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Sir K Tebbit’s
Visit to Washington,
18-19
July’.
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