The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
it is more
important than ever that the … inspectors are given unconditional
and
unrestricted
access …”
129.
The FCO stated
that “UN measures” had “played a vital role in
frustrating
Saddam’s
ambitions to develop WMD” and described the new sanctions regime
adopted
by the UN
on 14 May 2002 as demonstrating “that the international community
remains
united in
its determination to control the export of military-related items
to Iraq”.
130.
In response to
a potential suggestion that the absence of the promised
dossier
demonstrated
the weakness of the Government’s case, the FCO stated:
“Not at
all. The scale of the Iraqi WMD programme uncovered by UN
inspectors
in the
1990s demonstrates the extent of Saddam’s ambitions. And his
previous
use of
chemical agents against his own people demonstrates that he will
show
no compunction
in using such weapons.
“… All of
our intelligence reporting, revelations from Iraqi defectors and
past
experience
tells us that Iraq is taking advantage of absence of inspections to
revive
its
chemical, biological and nuclear programmes.”
131.
The FCO also
referred to the examples of past Iraqi concealment and
deceit
identified
in UNSCOM’s final report in 1999.
132.
The FCO stated
that further details on Iraq’s WMD programmes were set
out
in the
draft dossier on Iraq, which had been produced earlier in the year
for possible
publication.
133.
A separate FCO
brief on the policy of containment stated:
•
The purpose
of the policy (of containment) had been to ensure that Iraq
was
disarmed
through two main elements:
{{disarmament
through inspections regimes; and
{{reducing
Iraq’s ability to finance its WMD programmes by controlling
its
revenues
from oil.
•
The policy
had “some success in dismantling Saddam’s arsenal when
the
inspectors
were able to operate”, and it had “slowed his efforts to rebuild
WMD”.
The arms
embargo had “been effective in preventing Saddam acquiring
new
complete
weapons systems”.
•
But, “in
the absence of inspectors”, Iraq could “work on its WMD
programmes
unimpeded”
and Iraq was “in violation of a string of Security Council
resolutions
intended to
curb” those programmes.
•
Controls on
revenues were “eroding”, giving Saddam “access to large
sums
over which
the international community had no control” and “much” of that
was
“certainly
going into his high-priority WMD programmes”.
138