The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

120.  Lt Gen Pigott briefed Adm Boyce on 17 July that his view was that the UK should

encourage thinking to move towards action in 2003 to 2004 rather than in 2002 to 2003,

which “had a better chance of success” given the challenges “including political red

cards”.57 That was: “Not a recipe for delay, indeed quite the reverse.” It would be difficult

for the UK to send land forces to participate in a “running start” but the UK thinking was

“taking us towards a ‘distinctive’ (Package 3) role”. For any significant contribution, force

preparation would need to start “now”.

121.  The advice from Lt Gen Pigott and the SPG was discussed in a restricted Chiefs

of Staff meeting on 17 July.58

122.  In preparation for a meeting to be held on 18 July, Mr Bowen outlined the MOD’s

thinking in a minute to Mr Hoon on 17 July.59 He drew attention to the US concepts of

“running” and “generated” starts. He advised that the indications were that the US favoured

the “running start” option (which could see US operations beginning during 2002).

123.  Mr Bowen suggested that:

“In the meantime, as we begin to explore possible UK contributions we need

to identify what preparation – such as procurement for urgent operational

requirements – could usefully begin now … ”

124.  In mid-July, a Cabinet Office paper invited Ministers to “note” the potentially

long lead times for equipping UK forces to undertake operations in Iraq and

sought agreement that the MOD could bring forward proposals for procurement

of equipment.

125.  Although it was agreed that the UK should proceed on the assumption that

the UK would participate in any military action, there was no decision on whether

funds could be spent on preparations.

126.  The Cabinet Office paper ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’ was issued on

19 July to those attending a meeting to be chaired by Mr Blair on 23 July.60 That meeting

is addressed in Section 3.3.

127.  Ministers were invited to “note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping

UK Armed Forces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre”; and to “agree that MOD

should bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements

under cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan” and the “outcome” of the 2002

Spending Review.

57  Minute DCDS(C) to DPSO/CDS, 17 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Summary of Key Issues’.

58  Minutes, 17 July 2002, Chiefs of Staff (Restricted) meeting.

59  Minute DG Op Pol to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 17 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

60  Paper Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’.

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