The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
366.
Mr Blair
and Secretary Rice agreed on the need to step up contacts with
Sunni
groups and
the importance of ensuring an effective, competent, centrist
government
after the
elections. Mr Blair raised the issue of the future of the
coalition forces,
emphasising
the importance of avoiding the impression both of cutting and
running and
of wanting
to stay for ever. He had originally believed that the coalition
should agree with
the current
Iraqi Government a clear plan for the build up of Iraqi forces and
drawdown
of
coalition forces, but had concluded that it would be better to wait
until the new
government
was formed.
367.
The Chiefs of
Staff considered strategy on Iraq when they met on 18
October.161
They
concluded that the insurgency had continued to worsen and that:
“Without a
change in
the coalition strategy or its implementation, this trend could be
expected
to continue.”
368.
Although most
of the attacks had been in Baghdad and the three
Sunni‑dominated
northern
provinces, “they might spread more widely if the insurgency
continued to grow”.
369.
The Chiefs
considered that the UK’s main effort in Iraq should remain
Security
Sector
Reform. The existing UK strategy was:
“… not
fundamentally flawed, but its implementation was failing.
Inadequate funding
was
contributing significantly to this and reflected a lack of
cross-Government buy-in
to the
campaign and the incoherence of inter-Departmental activities. The
military
effort was
well-resourced compared to the commitments by other
Government
departments
to other Lines of Operation.”
370.
The Chiefs
also concluded that “Ministers needed to be clear that the
campaign
could
potentially be heading for ‘strategic failure’, with grave national
and international
consequences
if the appropriate actions were not taken”. They believed that
“the
establishment
of well defined Ministerial ownership would be a key factor in
addressing
it”.
Although the UK/US relationship was strong at the military level,
“political connections
needed to
be strengthened”.
371.
Lieutenant
General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Commitments),
was
commissioned to produce two papers. The first was to set out the
risk and nature
of
strategic failure in Iraq and “the importance of ensuring that the
PM was clear about
these
issues and could therefore be expected to direct appropriate
cross-Government
action”.
The second paper would set out the links needed to improve UK
engagement
with the US
and “energise the cross-Whitehall approach to Iraq”.
161
Minutes, 18
October 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
550