3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
the support
of enough of the Arab world. The French would be prepared to
go
a long way
to secure UN support for a military operation, which they
believe
might just
be obtainable if (a very big if) the Americans want it enough
…
[O]n past
precedent, formal UN authorisation is not an absolute requirement
…
But what
would be indispensable would be a Security Council statement
(not
necessarily
in the form of a SCR [Security Council resolution]) that Iraq was
in
breach
of its obligations and a warning making clear to Iraq the
consequences of
continued
violation.”
•
The new
Government had been “careful not to rule out the possibility of
French
participation
in an operation with UN backing … They know that …
French
interests
in the region will be tied to the success or failure of US action.
The
French will
certainly not want to be excluded from what happens
afterwards.
This will
increase the pressure on them to acquiesce in any action
…”
37.
Sir John’s
view was that France shared the UK’s desire to avoid “a
great
European split”.
He advocated engagement “seriously and early … at every
level,
including
Chirac”. That:
“… should
not just be, or seem to be, as a catspaw for the Americans, when
our
minds are
already made up and decisions taken, but as a genuine open‑ended
and
open‑minded
consultation. They will respond well if they think we are
serious.”
38.
Information on
Iraq’s WMD was “a particularly urgent priority”. France accepted
“in
principle
that after 11 September we cannot watch while WMD threats develop”,
but was
“not yet
convinced that Iraq presents an imminent, severe danger, and
certainly not one
that
justifies the wider risks of a military operation”.
39.
Mr Rycroft
sent Sir John Holmes’ telegram of 26 July with the FCO advice
of 30 July
to
Mr Blair on 31 July.12
40.
The FCO
response to Mr Blair’s request for a background paper on
UN
inspections
was to provide a copy of the relevant section from the draft
dossier
prepared
for publication.
41.
In response to
Mr Blair’s request for background on UN inspections,
Mr Straw’s
Private
Secretary advised that the “best available assessment” was in the
“Cabinet
Office
document now awaiting a decision on publication”.13
He provided
the section on
the
‘History of UN Inspections in Iraq’ dated 20 June (see Section
4.1), which described
12
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Background
Papers’.
13
Letter
Davies to Rycroft, 29 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting 22
[sic] July’.
99