The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
590.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary described the planned Parliamentary statement
to
Dr Meghan
O’Sullivan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan, on
591.
The Private
Secretary advised Mr Blair the following day that there were
“rumblings
of
discontent within the US system about the timing of the statement”,
which some in the
US
Administration would have preferred the UK to put off until
April.305
592.
The Private
Secretary also told Mr Blair:
“There are
signs that US, and Iraqi, attitudes to transition could cause us
difficulties.
Neither
party shows much enthusiasm for transition in the Spring (or even
Summer).
This could
well affect our own plans, with the [US] Corps now judging that
Maysan
might be
ready for transition in May, but that Basra probably won’t be ready
in June.
As you
heard at DOP, the MOD are very keen that the idea of drawing‑down
by a
further
battalion at the end of August should be a fixed target. DOP agreed
to review
this in the
Summer, and it will – as now – be difficult to justify a further
draw‑down
(especially
out of the city centre) if we retain nominal responsibility for
security.”306
593.
Lt Gen Lamb
sent a report on his work on reconciliation, which MOD
forwarded
to
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary on 15 February.307
Knowledge
of the negotiations was
limited to
a very small number of individuals on both the Iraqi and the MNF‑I
sides.
594.
On Sunni
engagement, Lt Gen Lamb reported that there had been MNF‑I
effort
since
summer 2006 to bring Sunni insurgent groups into a dialogue that
might lead to
a cease‑fire
with the MNF/ISF.
595.
Lt Gen Lamb
had established substantive negotiations with leadership elements
of
Ansar
al‑Sunna, Jaysh al‑Islami and Jaysh al‑Mujahadeen. The groups were
negotiating
among
internal factions the possibility of forming a single organisation,
calling a
cease‑fire
and working to defeat AQ‑I. Lt Gen Lamb reported that a
confidence‑building
test case
was under way within Baghdad and Anbar, in which an
economic
reconstruction
package was provided in return for “local protection in the
area”.
596.
Lt Gen Lamb
reported that negotiations with Shia/JAM representatives in
Sadr
City were
less advanced and were more complicated. JAM was not a
homogenous
organisation.
The Mayor of Sadr City had begun to engage politically with the
MNF
and ISF
and the possibility of contact with other Shia/JAM leaders in
Baghdad was
being explored.
304
Minute
Banner to Sheinwald, 15 February 2007, ‘Iraq/NSC’.
305
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 16 February 2007, ‘Iraq – Statement to
the House’.
306
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 16 February 2007, ‘Iraq update, 16
February’.
307
Letter
McNeil to Banner, 15 February 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Reconciliation and
Outreach Update’ enclosing
Note
‘SBMR‑I Reconciliation/Outreach Sitrep’.
110