9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
433.
A separate
explosion at a Sunni mosque near Basra the following day,
which
killed five
people, looked to have been a sectarian retaliation fuelled by this
belief.
MNF considered
that the earlier attack could well have been intra-Shia
violence.
434.
On 28
September, government officials working closely with the military
met JAM1
again. The
day before the meeting JAM1 had telephoned to warn that JAM
elements
had
identified British soldiers deployed to the north of Basra, and
were preparing an
attack.211
The
officials alerted MND(SE) and the troops were extracted
immediately.
435.
The previous
day’s incident was not discussed during the meeting which
began
by focusing
on an IDF attack on Basra Air Station that morning. The officials
reported
that Maj
Gen Binns had been talked out of cancelling the release of five
detainees due
that day as
a result, adding “some still have not quite got the concept that we
are buying
[JAM1’s]
support and influence to advance peace, not peace
itself”.
436.
The officials
then asked JAM1 what JAM members were doing while they
were
not
fighting – was there a risk that redundancy would inspire boredom
and restlessness
and
increase the chances of further violence? JAM1 agreed that people
needed work.
Possibilities
might include the Army, the Police Force, manual work on
reconstruction or
learning
new skills.
437.
Mr McDonald
discussed future plans for Iraq with Mr Hadley in Washington
on
27
September.212
Reporting
on their meeting to the MOD, Mr McDonald said he
had
explained
the UK assumption that PIC would happen in November or December
2007,
after which
point the UK would retain a similar military presence until March
2008
(5,000 troops,
4,500 of which would be based at Basra Air Station).
438.
Beyond March
2008 the UK aspired to reduce troop numbers in stages
over the spring
and summer, to around 1,500. That would require “significant
US
support in
Basra”.
439.
Mr Hadley’s
staff expressed concern about the numbers after March 2008.
They
indicated
that the US had hoped that the UK would retain the lead in Basra
throughout
2008; the
US had not planned to deploy to Basra in large numbers. Gen
Petraeus had
already set
out the tasks that he wanted the UK to fulfil in
MND(SE).
440.
In response,
Mr McDonald said that the UK was already unable to
perform
some of
those tasks: the UK had therefore “considered the list as a high
opening bid”.
Mr McDonald
reported that they had discussed “the bare bones of a compromise”:
the
UK would
retain 4,500 troops in Basra until March 2008 (the “tactical
overwatch” period);
between
March and November (“operational overwatch”) the UK would reduce
its troops
to
2,000-2,500, focused on training and mentoring but retaining some
intervention
capacity.
In extremis, they would need to rely on “over-the-horizon US
support”.
211
Email
government official working closely with the military, 30 September
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Meeting with [JAM1] on 28 September’.
212
Letter
McDonald to Forber, 28 September 2007, ‘Iraq; Meeting with Steve
Hadley, 27 September’.
265