9.6  |  27 June 2007 to April 2008

421.  The report included the comment:

“This might be a straw in the wind. Or it might represent a significant opportunity to

stretch out for a much larger prize …”

422.  Sir John Scarlett and Mr McDonald met on 24 September to discuss Iraq.207

According to his record of the meeting, during the discussion Sir John observed that

decisions about the pace of the UK’s drawdown in Basra needed to be taken “with a

clear eye to the current cease-fire”. It was important that the JIC reached a judgement

on the robustness of the cease-fire and what was keeping it going.

423.  Sir John considered that creating a “long-term calm” in Basra would require

“energetic” reconstruction and political action.

424.  The MCNS discussed Basra at length at its 25 September meeting.208 The Minister

of State for National Security, Mr Sherna al-Wa’ili, reported, based on his recent visit

to Basra, that it was “not as bad as portrayed”. During the visit he met Gen Mohan

and Gen Jalil, who had claimed the problems were due to foreign interference and the

many political groups struggling for power. He considered that Gen Mohan was doing

a good job, but needed additional support from Baghdad and more forces. Gen Jalil

also needed additional forces plus support in retraining 6,000 police officers and more

materiel support, including fuel and equipment.

425.  Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh said that he had met 12 cross-party Basrawi

MPs at their request. Their assessment was that the situation was bad and they

expected it to get worse. The numbers of assassinations and attacks were rising and

there had been only one arrest. The MPs were critical of both Gen Mohan and Gen Jalil

and argued that it was necessary to bring in forces from outside the local area.

426.  Deputy Prime Minister Saleh said that it would be important to ensure that

politicking between the main political parties in the Council of Representatives did not

adversely affect the situation in Basra. He concluded that Baghdad-based Basrawi

politicians should be encouraged to keep their local representatives in line.

427.  Mr Prentice commented:

“The discussion on Basra reflects the continued unease in the Iraqi system about the

situation there. We are not going to overcome this in the coming weeks as we move

towards a decision on PIC. But we will continue to address it with all interlocutors,

including the incessantly gloomy (and self-interested) MPs: taking them through

all the work we have done to improve Basra’s security and economic situation;

underlining that we will continue to provide support post-PIC; but emphasising that

the GoI and others in positions of influence must also play their part in working

207  Minute C, 25 September 2007, C’s Meeting with Simon McDonald’.

208  eGram 39796/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 27 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Ministerial Committee on

National Security, 25 September’.

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