3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
207.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that the US message to President Fox
would
be that it
was “not interested in another series of
negotiations”.
208.
In a
subsequent bilateral conversation, Secretary Powell and
Mr Straw discussed
the
position of Mexico and Chile.72
209.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that President Lagos had not yet spoken
to
President
Chirac. President Bush would tell President Fox that
Mr Blair’s “offer was
all he was
going to get”. The US was “not interested in another series of
negotiations.
Any modifications
would have to be made tomorrow for a vote on
Thursday.”
210.
Reporting that
Dr Rice was “showing some interest in ditching OP3” (the
provision
that Iraq
had to demonstrate it was co-operating by a defined date),
Secretary Powell
stated that
he had pointed out that President Chirac would “veto anything,
explaining
that the
simplest language was being used as a pretext for
war”.
211.
The FCO
asked Ambassadors in Arab countries to make clear that little
time
was left to
persuade Saddam Hussein to stand down.
212.
In a telegram
on the afternoon of 11 March, the FCO stated:
“If the
Arabs are still serious about pressing Saddam to stand aside, they
need to get
going now
without waiting for a second UN SCR. If they delay there may not be
time
“We are now
approaching the end game on Iraq. A vote on the current draft
Security
Council
resolution is now likely this week. If this includes, as at
present, a deadline
for Iraqi
action, our assumption is that that is the end point for Arab
efforts. If the
resolution
does not pass, the window for Arab action may be very short, and
might
not be
explicit.”
214.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that they should not put the draft
resolution
to a vote
if there would be a French veto. He was considering whether the
UK
strategy
needed to be adapted, but had not yet agreed that with
Mr Blair.
215.
Secretary
Powell suggested that Mr Blair should make plain to
President
Bush the
UK’s problems if the second resolution failed.
216.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell spoke again at 6.45pm to discuss the
difficulties
with
securing nine votes in the Security Council and the timing of
military action.74
72
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 11 March 2003, Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary
of State,
11 March’.
73
Telegram 31
FCO London to Riyadh, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Pressure on Saddam
from other Arab
Governments’.
74
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 12 March 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary
of State,
11 March’.
437