The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1363. The potential consequences of Iraq’s poor infrastructure for post-conflict

operations were identified in the 4 September edition of the SPG paper on military

strategic thinking, which stated:

“Given fractious nature of Iraqi politics, broad regional concern on nature of

new Iraqi government, and poor state of Iraqi infrastructure, delivery of stated

post-conflict objectives will require lengthy engagement.”591

1364. The 30 September edition of the SPG paper stated that Iraqi infrastructure was

“poorly maintained by the current regime with damage from the war of 1991 still not

repaired”.592

1365. The FCO paper ‘Models for Administering a Post-Saddam Iraq’, presented to the

AHGI on 11 October, stated that administering Iraq would involve restoration of critical

infrastructure.593

1366. The Cabinet Office paper on models for Iraq after Saddam Hussein, sent to

Sir David Manning on 1 November, listed priorities facing the transitional military

government to be established by the Coalition after the collapse of the Iraqi regime.594

Those included emergency work on infrastructure involving close co-ordination with

civilian development agencies.

1367. The implications of the fragile state of Iraq’s infrastructure for the Iraqi

people and for achieving post-conflict objectives were clearly stated in an

FCO paper for the AHGI in November 2002 and by Ms Short in Parliament on

30 January 2003.

1368. The FCO paper on economic issues in Iraq, sent to AHGI members on

4 November 2002, described Iraq’s economy as “distorted and very badly damaged”.595

The FCO stated:

“Even if a new conflict produces little additional damage, the combination of neglect

and war damage means that large investments in many areas and spread over

many years, are needed if infrastructure and services are to recover even to their

pre-1990 condition. Getting this process under way will be essential to economic

revival, to the alleviation of humanitarian problems and to popular support for a new

administration.”

591 Paper [SPG], 4 September 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.

592 Paper [SPG], 30 September 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.

593 Paper FCO, [undated, version received at AHGI, 11 October 2002], ‘Models for Administering

a Post‑Saddam Iraq’.

594 Minute Drummond to Manning, 1 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Post-Saddam’ attaching Paper ‘Iraq: Models

and some questions for post-Saddam government’.

595 Paper FCO, [undated], ‘Economic issues in Iraq after post-Saddam regime change: internal policy and

external engagement’.

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