The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
81.
In April 2002,
Sir Christopher Meyer, British Ambassador to the US, warned
of
the need to
learn the lessons from Afghanistan, where “US fear of getting
sucked
into
nation-building” and Secretary Rumsfeld’s insistence on a
“minimalist approach”
82.
In a speech in
New York on 14 February 2003, described in more detail in
Section
6.5,
Secretary Rumsfeld drew lessons for Iraq from the US experience of
nation-building
in
Afghanistan:
“Afghanistan
belongs to the Afghans. The objective is not to engage in what
some
call
nation-building. Rather it is to help the Afghans so they can build
their own
nation.
This is an important distinction. In some nation-building exercises
well-
intentioned
foreigners … can create a dependency.”63
83.
Sir David
Manning told the Inquiry:
“… it’s
quite clear throughout 2002, and indeed throughout 2003, that it is
the
Pentagon,
it’s the military, who are running this thing …
“… Bush had
this vision of a new Middle East. You know, we are going to
change
Iraq, we
are going to change Palestine, and it’s all going to be a new
Middle East.
“But there
were … big flaws in this argument. One is they won’t do
nation-building.
They think
this is a principle. So if you go into Iraq, how are you going to
achieve this
new Iraq?
And the military certainly don’t think it’s their
job.”64
84.
Hard
Lessons characterised
US planning for post-conflict Iraq between
autumn 2001
and early 2003 as a “tense interplay” between the DoD and the
State
Department.65
Many in the
DoD anticipated US forces being greeted as liberators
who
would be
able leave Iraq within months, with no need for the US to
administer the
functions
of Iraq’s government after major combat operations. The State
Department
judged that
rebuilding Iraq would require “a US commitment of enormous scope”
over
several
years.
85.
In his
Chicago speech of 22 April 1999, Mr Blair listed five
considerations to
guide
decisions on military intervention in another country. Those
included being
prepared
for the long term: “we cannot simply walk away once the fight is
over”.
62
Telegram
451 Washington to FCO London, 1 April 2002, ‘PM’s Visit to Texas:
Bush and the War
on
Terrorism’.
63
US
Department of Defense, 14 February 2003, Speech:
Beyond Nation Building.
64
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 42-43.
65
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
128