The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
support for
what is likely to be a very protracted post‑war phase, than for
the
attack
itself. Afghanistan has shown that the US is not good at
consolidating
politically
what it has achieved militarily.”
337.
Sir Christopher
commented:
“The Prime
Minister will have very clear ideas how he wants to play Iraq with
Bush.
I would say
only that it is more important to get it right than to do it fast.
Bush’s head
will agree.
But his heart is impatient, he fears being labelled a wimp like his
father,
and his
emotions will be stirred by the approach of the 9/11
anniversary.”
There would
be “pressure on Bush to elide the distinction” between the two
positions.
338.
President
Chirac told Mr Blair that the inspectors had to return to
Iraq
immediately
with full powers and they needed to be intelligent. He would
support
that sort
of resolution.
339.
The
disadvantages of any US unilateralism would be much greater than
the
advantages.
340.
In a
conversation with President Chirac on 6 September, Mr Blair
asked for his
views in
advance of the meeting with President Bush.109
341.
President
Chirac’s response was reported to have included:
•
Iraq had
been “systematically and stupidly provoked … into getting rid of
the
inspectors”.
•
He did not
think Saddam Hussein “posed an immediate nuclear danger,
but
clearly
there were CBW risks”.
•
The
inspectors had to return immediately, but in the current climate
Mr Annan
should give
Iraq an assurance that the inspectors were real, not
spies.
•
The
inspectors must have full powers, but they needed to be
intelligent.
342.
President
Chirac told Mr Blair that France would support that sort of UN
resolution,
but if that
did not work, there were two scenarios:
•
The US
could attack Iraq on its own initiative but, “France would not
participate,
‘since we
are against unilateralism and do not want to feed
anti‑Americanism’,
and because
it would be dangerous militarily especially if Saddam had
CBW.
It would
not lead to the right result. There was a risk of Iraq blowing up
in the
absence of
a serious opposition figure to take power. The disadvantages
would
109
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime
Minister’s Phone Call with
President
Chirac, 6 September’.
154