6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
“when
ready”, conducting “operations to complete the defeat of the
surviving
loyal
elements”; and
•
ensuring
that a “massive humanitarian aid effort” was available “to provide
life
support to
non‑combatants”.
1023.
Other new
points identified in the paper included:
•
Draft
objectives for a northern option remained under consideration by
the
Pentagon.
•
The UK was
“seeking to place” force generation and preparation efforts “in
an
appropriate
framework to determine their effect and timing” in the “Force
on
Mind
campaign”.
•
The
adoption of the UN track meant that the timing of a military
operation
might
“shift to the point of failure of UN processes” and might be
required in
“hot
months”. The SPG’s initial assessment was that the UK would
“be able
to
continue
operations” but it was
“feasible that, at some point”, the risk might
“become
unacceptable”.
•
Mitigation
measures were being identified to address the risk of attacks
using
chemical
and biological weapons and residual hazards after the
military
campaign.
•
The CENTCOM
plan included “sequential ground attack into Iraq from
SE
Turkey to
coincide with the main effort attack of V Corps forces in the South
…
the
northern option … built upon the 4th Infantry Division of the US
Army”. That
might
“include UK Package 3 forces pending political decision”. Command
and
control
procedures and the likelihood of delivering a Corps Headquarters
for the
force had
“yet to be determined”.
1024.
The preference
for the northern option was stressed by Major General
Robin Brims, the
General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1st (UK) Armoured
Division,
when he met
Lieutenant General David McKiernan, Commander, Coalition Forces
Land
Component
Command, on 10 November.405
Although
possible operations in the South
were
discussed, Maj Gen Brims reported that
Lt Gen McKiernan and his superiors
wanted UK
forces to be used in the North.
1025.
Brigadier
Albert Whitley was deployed to Lt Gen McKiernan’s HQ in
Kuwait in
early
November as Senior British Land Advisor (SBLA).406
He was
“involved in planning
for UK
military action and participation” and asked by
Lt Gen McKiernan, in the absence
of a
dedicated Corps headquarters, to lead a joint UK/US team to plan an
attack from
Turkey.
1026.
On 11
November, Maj Gen Fry asked for more guidance on the
likely Phase
IV tasks
for the UK; and whether he should assume that a general role in
Phase III
405
Minute GOC
1(UK) Armd Div to CJO, 10 November 2002, ‘Meeting with
Lt Gen McKiernan (CFLCC)’.
406
Statement
Whitley, 25 January 2011, page 3.
329