The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The Iraqi
authorities were planning, in the context of the Baghdad Security
Plan,
to close
the Syrian and Iranian borders.
•
Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Salih had agreed to energise governance of
the
energy
sector, and would chair a committee of Ministers on which Lt Gen
Lamb
would
sit.
429.
On planning
for transition, Lt Gen Lamb commented:
“Get it
right, and all our Christmases will come at once – it is powerful.
Get it wrong
and we
potentially set ourselves up for a very messy finish.”
430.
Mr Blair
met Secretary Gates on 14 January and discussed the recent
US
announcement
and the UK plans for MND(SE).232
Mr Blair
contrasted security in
Baghdad and
Basra, noting that this was a distinction that Prime Minister
Maliki was
always keen
to draw. He said that the UK would not make its decision on
re‑posturing
and drawing
down its forces in Basra unless it was absolutely clear that the
conditions
had been
met. It was essential to be confident that the Iraqi forces could
hold Basra after
UK
withdrawal.
431.
Secretary
Gates welcomed that reassurance, explaining that the US would
prefer
the UK to
remain in Basra until later in the year. In his view, Basra was not
yet ready for
transition.
He was also concerned that a UK withdrawal would create political
difficulties
for other
coalition partners and could have a negative impact on other
countries’
contribution
to the MNF.
432.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s record of the meeting also noted that Mr Blair had
mentioned
Afghanistan
“in the context of our proposed drawdown in Basra”.
433.
On 15 January,
the British Embassy Office Basra reported receipt of a
letter
from the
Chairman of the Provincial Council which set a number of conditions
to be
met before
re‑engagement with the UK would be considered.233
They
included an
official
apology, compensation and withdrawal from specified MNF bases in
Basra city.
The British
Embassy Office recommended “a robust line” in
response.
434.
On 16 January,
Mr Blair met ACM Stirrup and senior officials from the FCO,
the
MOD, SIS,
DFID and the Cabinet Office for an update on Iraq.234
435.
Mr Blair
asked how the proposal to draw down to 4,500 troops would affect
the
UK’s
capability in Basra. ACM Stirrup assured him that:
“… there
would be no impact, and no difference in our ability to create
military
effect,
though this would in future be focused on training and mentoring.
The troops
232
Letter
Sheinwald to Forber, 15 January 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with US Defense Secretary,
14 January:
Iraq and Afghanistan’.
233
eGram
1607/07 Basra to FCO London, 15 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra:
Disengagement’.
234
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 16 January 2007, ‘Iraq; Meeting with
Officials’.
80