The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
404.
Mr Straw
stated that the issue, which “could not be graver”, was “about
the
authority
of the United Nations and about the responsibility of the Security
Council for
international
peace and security”. All the members of the Council knew that Iraq
had
“had these
weapons [of mass destruction and long-range missiles]”; Iraq had
been
“found
guilty” in 1991. The issue was whether Iraq was “actively
co-operating to get
rid of them”.
405.
Mr Straw
stated that Iraq had lied, had concealed weapons and played
games.
As Dr Blix
and Dr ElBaradei had:
“… spelled
out in their report of 27 January, Iraq has failed to account for
thousands
of tons of
chemical weapons and precursor chemicals, of shells and bombs
for
anthrax,
for mustard gas, for VX nerve agent. They have failed to make a
full and
complete
disclosure as required of them … They have failed to co-operate
fully
and
actively on substance, as well as on process with the inspectors,
and failed
substantively
to meet the obligations imposed on them.”
“… nobody
who has spoken so far … has suggested for a second that Iraq is
fully
and
actively complying with the obligations that we imposed … So Iraq’s
material
breaches …
are still there.”
407.
Mr Straw
posed a number of questions for the inspectors
including:
•
What were
Iraq’s motives for refurbishing prohibited equipment
destroyed
by UNSCOM?
•
How many
interviews had taken place, and how many could the
inspectors
be sure
were not subject to Iraqi surveillance?
•
Had the
“outstanding material identified by UNSCOM” been
“satisfactorily
dealt with”?
•
How many
“open issues” in the nuclear dossier had the IAEA been
able
to close?
408.
Mr Straw
stated that he interpreted Dr Blix’s report as meaning that
“Iraq has yet
to be
forthcoming with … immediate, active and unconditional
co-operation”. Picking up
a phrase
from Dr Blix’s report of 27 January, Mr Straw asked
whether Dr Blix believed
Iraq had
“yet come to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament that has
been
demanded
of it”.
409.
“Like every
other member” of the Council, Mr Straw hoped and believed
that
a peaceful
solution to the crisis might “still be possible”. But that would
require
a “dramatic
and immediate change by Saddam” which would be achieved only if
the
Council
held its nerve.
252