The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
discussion,
Negroponte had “conceded the possibility of issuing an ultimatum
provided
that we had
the lock in our favour”.
228.
Separately,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock provided a revised draft
resolution.62
The
draft,
which had
been agreed with the US, recalled the provisions of previous
resolutions
including
resolution 1441 and, anticipating the reports from Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei
on 14
February, added a draft preambular paragraph (PP) suggesting that
the Security
Council was
“Deeply concerned” that the reports had “made clear” that Iraq had
“not
co‑operated
fully with inspections nor addressed deficiencies in the
declaration”
submitted
pursuant to resolution 1441.
229.
The draft
resolution proposed that the Security Council should decide that
“Iraq’s
submission
of a declaration containing false statements and omissions and
continuing
failure to
comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of,
resolution 1441
(2002)”
constituted “a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations under
relevant
resolutions
of the Council and that Iraq accordingly has failed to take the
final
opportunity
afforded to it by the Council in resolution 1441
(2002)”.
230.
The draft did
not contain a deadline, but stated that “Iraq alone” was
“fully
responsible
for the serious consequences it must now face as a result of its
continued
violations
of its obligations under the resolutions of the Council”; and that
the Council
had decided
“to remain seized of the matter”.
231.
Sir
Christopher Meyer advised that President Bush would not
tolerate
another two
months of negotiations. Washington was getting ready for
war
in mid- to
late March, although it did not want to act alone.
232.
In preparation
for a visit to Washington by Mr Hoon (see Section
6.2),
Sir Christopher
Meyer advised overnight on 10/11 February that: “Washington is
getting
233.
Sir
Christopher wrote:
“For the
Administration and the Hill the time has come to go to war.
Powell’s
presentation
to the UNSC has boosted public support for war, including
support
for action
without UN approval, provided that some Allies join in. In Congress
it
has
silenced most of those who were asking for more evidence. The
cautious
multilateralists
of both parties now accept that the case has been made
…
“The
Administration would go to war without a further UNSCR, but knows
that
others need
one. For the time being Bush is following the UN route and has
said
publicly
that he would support a second resolution. But he will not tolerate
another
two months’
negotiation. Everything points towards early action, possibly
by
62
Telegram
237 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 10
February’.
63
Telegram
189 Washington to FCO London, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Defence
Secretary’s Visit
to Washington
– 11-12 February’.
222