The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

269.  Outside No.10, only Mr Straw was sent a personal copy of the record of that

discussion.

270.  Mr Blair and President Bush agreed they should meet on 7 September to

discuss Iraq.

271.  President Bush announced the meeting on 4 September, as part of wider

remarks about his determination to disarm Iraq about which he would also be

consulting Congress and other world leaders.

272.  President Bush and Mr Blair spoke later on 3 September.90 They discussed

Mr Blair’s press conference and Mr Blair said he was confident that a very strong case

could be made against Saddam Hussein. Mr Blair’s visit to the US would be announced

the next day. It would follow a US National Security Council meeting on 7 September

and precede President Bush’s speech to the UN on 12 September. They would also

discuss the handling of the UK dossier.

273.  On 4 September, in a press opportunity after a meeting with Congressional

leaders in the White House to discuss foreign policy, President Bush stated that they

had spent most of their time “talking about a serious threat to the United States” and to

the world from Saddam Hussein. Doing nothing about that threat was “not an option”.91

He “looked forward to an open dialogue with Congress and the American people”.

The Administration would “participate fully in any hearings” that Congress wished to

hold, and “at the appropriate time” he would seek Congressional approval to “deal with

the threat”.

274.  President Bush also announced that he had asked Mr Blair to “come to Camp

David on Saturday” where they would discuss “mutual concerns about how to make the

world more secure and safe”. President Bush said that he would also speak to other

world leaders, including those of China, France and Russia, before giving his speech at

the UN General Assembly in New York the following week.

275.  Asked whether putting weapons inspectors back into Iraq was a viable option,

President Bush replied that the issue was disarmament not inspectors. That was the

primary issue and he would be discussing “ways to make sure that that is the case”.

In response to a subsequent question, President Bush added that he would be calling

“on the world to recognize that he [Saddam]” was “stiffing the world”; and discussing

“ways to make sure that he fulfils his obligations”.

90 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone Call with President Bush,

3 September’.

91 The White House, 4 September 2002, President discusses Foreign Policy with Congressional Leaders.

142