The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

keeping UK forces inside Basra city; Ministers should consider what operational purpose

would be served by their presence.

226. DOP(I) agreed that:

• The UK should keep the existing policy goal, but recognise that the best

outcome achievable might fall short of it.

• A progressive reduction of UK forces to 4,500 in 2007, in concert with US and

other allies, was possible, with more ambitious reductions being considered

at the end of November.

• The FCO would lead on urgent work on the security of staff in Basra.

227. On 20 October, Sir David Manning, British Ambassador to the US, reported that

Iraq was dominating debate in advance of the mid-term elections:

“The recent upsurge in violence, the failure of the Baghdad security plan and the

greatly increased US casualty figures – ten killed on 18 October alone – have

increased the concern.”137

228. There was increasing speculation in Washington that, against the backdrop of

probable Republican electoral losses, the violence in Iraq and the unpopularity of the

war would force the Administration to change its strategy, including by abandoning its

open‑ended commitment.

229. Senior members of the Administration were sticking to “no change”, but

according to the Embassy, a policy shift could not be ruled out. The Iraq Study Group

– “a bipartisan group set up by Bush earlier this year and co‑chaired by Jim Baker and

Lee Hamilton” – and its forthcoming report offered “the most obvious vehicle for change”.

230. In a meeting with Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Sir David Manning on 23 October,

Mr Stephen Hadley, the US National Security Advisor, “accepted that the Baghdad

Security Plan was not succeeding”.138 He observed that:

“The Iraqi Army had not deployed as expected, and the Iraqi Police could not hold

the ground cleared by US and Iraqi troops. The basic problem appeared to be that

the Iraqi Government had not bought into the Plan.”

231. The US was considering how best to address the problem, which was likely to

involve an increase in Iraqi Army numbers and potentially supplying more equipment.

232. Sir Nigel remarked that there was “a sense of stasis” in Iraq policy, which made

it a good moment to reflect on strategy. He said that Mr Blair would not want to see

137 eGram 46668/06 Washington to FCO London, 20 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Change of Strategy?’

138 Letter Banner to Siddiq, 25 October 2006, ‘US/Middle East’.

46