The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
It could
mean that the dossier was embellished with items of intelligence
known
or believed
to be false or unreliable … or it could mean … that the dossier
was
drafted in
such a way as to make the case against Saddam Hussein as
strong
as the
intelligence contained in it permitted. If the term is used in this
latter sense,
then
because of the drafting suggestions made by 10 Downing Street for
the
purpose of
making a strong case against Saddam Hussein, it could be said that
the
Government
‘sexed up’ the dossier. However … I consider that the allegation …
that
the dossier
had been embellished with intelligence known or believed to be
false or
unreliable,
which was not the case.”321
594.
The
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction by a
Committee
of Privy
Counsellors chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell (“The Butler
Report”, HC 8980),
was
published on 14 July 2004.322
595.
Describing the
purpose of the dossier, the Butler Report stated:
“… the
dossier was not intended to make the case for a particular course
of action
in relation
to Iraq. It was intended by the Government to promote domestic
and
international
understanding of, and gain support for, the general direction in
which
Government
policy had been moving since the early months of 2002, away
from
containment
to a more proactive approach to enforcing Iraqi
disarmament.”323
596.
The Butler
Report also stated:
•
“The
Government wanted a document on which it could draw in its
advocacy
of its
policy. The JIC sought to offer a dispassionate assessment of
intelligence
and other
material on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic
missile
•
“…
the
language of the dossier may have left with readers the
impression
that there
was fuller and firmer intelligence behind the
judgements
than was
the case: our view, having reviewed all of the material, is
that
judgements
in the dossier went to (although not beyond) the outer
limits
of the
intelligence available. The Prime
Minister’s description in his statement
to the
House of Commons … [on 24 September] of the picture painted by
the
intelligence
services in the dossier as ‘extensive, detailed and authoritative’
may
have
reinforced this impression.”325
321
The
National Archives, 28 January 2004, Report of
the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding
the Death
of Dr David Kelly [“The Hutton
Report”], paragraph 228.
322
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898.
323
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
319.
324
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
327.
325
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
464.
228