The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Even if
there is a second (and possibly third) UNSCR this is no guarantee
of
broad-based
international buy-in into Phase IV … [T]here is a real
possibility
of the
UK (along with the US and a few forward leaning smaller military
nations)
being
committed to Phase IV engagement without international burden
sharing
and without
an immediate exit strategy. At its worst this could expose the UK
to
an enduring
Large Scale military commitment (20-30,000 in theatre) –
and
the
commensurate
civil support required to contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq …
The
potential
consequences are severe … This is not the most likely risk, but it
is one
that
increases the further the outcome post-conflict is from a
UN-mandated solution.”
799.
In a speaking
note for Mr Hoon, officials highlighted concerns about the
tendency
of
discussion of the post-conflict phase, and the IPU annotated
agenda, to focus on the
military
contribution:
“A military
presence will be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
success
in
Iraq. A large,
organised and properly funded humanitarian assistance
plan
(supported
by DFID) is needed from the outset.
“… The UK
should identify now what civil contribution it will make to
rebuilding
in Iraq
and consider the cross-Government resource
consequences.
“We must
not shy away from the fact that there remains a very credible worst
case
scenario
that we shall want to proceed without either a second UNSCR or
wider
international
practical support. The possible implications of this for the UK,
across
the board,
are severe …
“We should
put in hand detailed work to consider these implications and
ways
of mitigating
possible effects.”
800.
The record
of the meeting on 6 March shows that Mr Hoon raised
the
question of
DFID/MOD co-ordination. There is no indication that
Ministers
discussed
the wider issues raised by MOD officials.
801.
Mr Cannon
told Mr Blair that Ministers needed to make progress on
three
interlinked
issues: the humanitarian response; the UN mandate; and whether the
UK
should
“take over control of” a geographical sector in
Iraq.340
Mr Cannon
explained:
•
Ms Short’s
demands for additional UN cover and funding had left the
military
concerned
that the job of securing Basra might be compromised by lack
of
DFID advance
planning.
•
Reports
from Washington indicated the US had “moved a long way” on
the
UN mandate.
•
Basra was
“the obvious choice” if the UK decided to take on one of
seven
geographical
sectors in Iraq.
340
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 5 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict
Issues’.
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