4.4 | The
search for WMD
460.
After the
meeting, Mr Scarlett wrote to Sir Nigel Sheinwald about the
need urgently
to address
the handling of the ISG Interim Report once it reached
Washington.254
461.
Mr Scarlett
told Sir Nigel that the ISG Interim Report was not expected to
differ
significantly
from the UK assessment, set out in a revised Discussion Note
following the
JIC meeting
on 10 September. Mr Scarlett identified the main points
as:
“•
the working
environment in Iraq has proved much more difficult than
expected
(poor
security situation, more denial, deception and
intimidation);
•
the
evidence so far has not shown that WMD programmes were active
pre-
conflict.
Nor has any firm evidence emerged of Iraq possessing
WMD;
•
Iraq
maintained an intention to restart its nuclear weapons programme
when UN
sanctions
were lifted, and concealed equipment and documentation in support
of
this (much
of this is already in the public domain);
•
there is
credible evidence confirming Iraq’s pursuit of ballistic and cruise
missile
programmes
with ranges well in excess of the UN’s permitted limit (this
will
receive
some publicity through Panorama
in late
September/early October);
•
it is not
yet possible to establish any firm picture of Iraq’s chemical and
biological
weapons
capability. The compartmented, highly concealable, and
dual-use
nature of
such programmes means that there are fewer firm leads to follow
…
It is too
early to conclude that there were no programmes, and we expect
more
information
to become available. But this will be a long and difficult
process;
•
there is
clear evidence that Iraq was in breach of UN Security
Council
Resolutions.”
462.
Mr Scarlett
advised that an ISG report along those lines, however interim,
would
raise
difficult questions. That underlined the need to ensure it was
handled correctly,
with US and
Australian agreement in advance. Mr Scarlett recommended
publication
of a short
executive summary, with the full Interim Report being treated as a
“classified
stocktake
for intelligence experts”. The summary should get across three
“fundamental
messages”:
•
the Interim
Report was “far from a considered final assessment”;
•
the ISG was
operating in a difficult security environment and after years
of
deception
and denial by Iraq; and
•
there was a
good deal more work to do.
254
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 12 September 2003, ‘Iraqi Survey group:
interim report’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
[undated], ‘Kay Report: Points to Make with US Interlocutors’ and
Note [JIC], [undated],
‘Iraqi WMD:
The Emerging Picture - Discussion Note for the JIC Meeting
10 September 2003’.
517