4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
1.
This Section
addresses the assessments between October 2002 and 19 March
2003
of Iraq’s
capabilities and intentions to:
•
develop,
produce and use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
and
ballistic
missiles; and
•
conceal
those programmes from the inspectors and obstruct their
activities.
2.
The Section
also addresses the:
•
advice
based on intelligence provided to Ministers and others;
and
•
withdrawal of
three important streams of SIS reporting in 2003 and
2004.
3.
The roles of
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and Secret Intelligence
Service
(SIS) are
addressed in Section 2.
4.
The assessment
of Iraq’s capabilities and intentions to develop, produce and
use
chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles between 2000
and
July 2002,
including the initial preparation of a paper on Iraq for
publication, is
addressed in
Section 4.1.
5.
The subsequent
JIC Assessments of 21 August and 9 September, the
preparation
of the
dossier published on 24 September and Mr Blair’s statement to
the House of
Commons on
the same day, are addressed in Section 4.2.
6.
The
post-invasion search for evidence of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)
in Iraq,
the Government’s response to the failure to find stockpiles of WMD
in Iraq,
demands for
an independent judge-led inquiry into pre-conflict intelligence
on
Iraq’s WMD
and the decision to establish the Butler Review, and the
Government’s
involvement
with the preparation and publication of the series of reports
produced
by the Iraq
Survey Group (ISG), are addressed in Section 4.4.
7.
The
development of UK strategy and options during this period,
including
Mr Blair’s and
Mr Straw’s statements to Parliament on 18 March 2003, is
addressed
in Sections
3.5 to 3.8.
8.
The military
planning for a campaign in which chemical and biological
weapons
could be
used, and the arrangements to provide protection for UK Forces, is
addressed
in Sections
6.1 to 6.3.
•
The core
construct that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical and
biological
warfare
capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance
its
capabilities,
including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and
was
pursuing an
active policy of deception and concealment, underpinned the
UK
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