The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
286.
Since October
1996, there had been “a pattern of efforts” by Iraq “to restrict
the
Commission’s
monitoring activities” which had caused “serious problems”.
UNSCOM
hoped that
commitments given by Mr Aziz to Mr Ekéus during their
meeting in April
would be
“translated into action”.
287.
There was “not
much” that was unknown about Iraq’s “proscribed
weapons
capabilities”,
but what was “unaccounted for” could not:
“… be
neglected. Even a limited inventory of long-range missiles would be
a source
of deep
concern if those missiles were fitted with warheads filled with the
most
deadly of
chemical nerve agents, VX. If one single missile warhead were
filled
with the
biological agent, Anthrax, many millions of lethal doses could be
spread
in an
attack on any city in the region. With that in mind, the Special
Commission
has
undertaken extraordinary efforts to bring to a satisfactory
conclusion the full
accounting
of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, in
order
to be able
to make sure that all the proscribed items have been disposed
of.”
“A solid
framework with tested procedures is in place. It is now time for
Iraq to make
full use of
this and to provide the material and data to give substance to its
stated
commitment
of full co-operation. The remaining problems … cannot be
solved
through a
technical process … Their solution requires the major political
decision by
Iraq’s
leadership to give up, once and for all, all capabilities and
ambition to retain or
acquire the
proscribed weapons …”
289.
UNSCOM’s
activities between October 1996 and April 1997 and the
discrepancies
between its
findings and Iraq’s declarations were set out in detail in an
Appendix to the
report.125
Its key
points included:
•
Iraq had
still not provided a credible account of quantities and types of
“special
warheads”
which had been produced for proscribed missiles, and UNSCOM
had
“evidence
that Iraq has provided incorrect information”.
•
Not all
chemical bombs had been declared by Iraq.
•
The “final
disposition of the programme for the production of … VX”
remained
“unresolved”.
Iraq claimed that it had only carried out activities “on
the
laboratory/pilot
plant scale”, and that it had destroyed “hundreds of tons of
VX
precursors
in 1991”. UNSCOM had “evidence that Iraq obtained the
technology”
and
retained “equipment for the large-scale production of
VX”.
•
In December
1996, UNSCOM had presented its concerns that “In an
attempt
to mislead
the Commission, Iraq had tried to falsify evidence” of
missile
destruction.
125
UN Security
Council, 11 April 1997, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1997/301),
‘Appendix I Inspection activities and operational, administrative
and other matters’.
74