The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
526.
Mr Blair
spoke to Mr Maliki on 28 April, to congratulate him and assure
him of the
UK’s
support.303
Mr Blair
said that it was important that Mr Maliki had good,
capable
people
around him, and that the UK stood ready to offer advice and
assistance, on both
policy and
communications.
527.
The Cabinet
Office circulated a draft FCO paper on Basra, which had
been
produced
for DOP(I), to members of the ISOG on 28 April.304
The draft
FCO paper
stated that:
“Security
and governance in Basra are bad and worsening. Attacks on us, and
both
criminal
and sectarian violence, are rising. Basic services are not being
delivered.
Basra is
one of the four provinces in Iraq judged by MNF(I) to be furthest
away from
transition
to full Iraqi control.
“The UK
civilian effort in Basra is increasingly hunkered down. We face a
lack of
co-operation
from the local authorities and severe restrictions on our
movement.
Our local
staff … suffer growing intimidation. Against this background, much
of our
effort –
notably the Provincial Reconstruction Team we are standing up in
May –
can make
little headway.”
528.
The FCO paper
was not submitted to DOP(I), but did inform discussions on
22 May
between
senior officials on how to achieve UK objectives in
Basra.
529.
Mr Blair
held a Cabinet reshuffle in early May 2006. Mr Benn
remained
Development
Secretary; Mr Des Browne replaced Dr Reid as Defence
Secretary; and
Mrs
Margaret Beckett replaced Mr Straw as Foreign
Secretary.
530.
Mr Mark
Lowcock, DFID Director General Policy and Programmes,
and
Mr Anderson
visited Baghdad from 2 to 5 May.305
They
reported to Mr Chakrabarti that
the new
Iraqi Government faced a daunting economic reform agenda. The
100-day plan
contained
some of the necessary reforms, but it seemed unlikely that it would
garner
wider
political support given the fragile political deals underpinning
the new Government.
531.
Iraq had
enjoyed a “massive windfall” from the rising oil price, possibly
an
additional
US$20bn a year. That dwarfed the amount of aid provided to Iraq.
While some
of that
windfall had been used to increase the budget:
“… billions
– some people say tens of billions – has been lost through
large-scale
corruption
and other leakage. Who has got the money and what do they plan to
do
with it?
And how is the Government going to regain control?”
532.
Mr Lowcock
and Mr Anderson confirmed that DFID should “continue to
move
towards
more capacity building and … internationalising the effort in
Iraq”.
303
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 28 April 2006, ‘Nouri al-Maliki’.
304
Paper FCO
[draft], 27 April 2006, ‘DOP(I): Basra’.
305
Minute
Lowcock and Anderson to Chakrabarti, 5 May 2006, ‘Visit to Baghdad
2-5 May’.
284