The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
369.
In political
terms, Lt Gen Cooper judged that:
“Despite
frequent and frustrating in-fighting, a good deal of positive
progress was
made
politically in the last year. The political parties cobbled
together a mini ‘grand
bargain’ to
pass the 2008 budget and the amnesty and provincial powers law; the
…
[Council of
Representatives] passed the provincial elections law and brought
down
their
powerful Speaker; and the GoI pushed the US back over successive
red lines
before
concluding the Security Agreement. In many ways, the political
class came
of age
…”
370.
Lt Gen Cooper
attributed campaign progress in Iraq to a range of factors,
including:
•
The clear
focus maintained by the US on its declared aim of
defeating
extremism
and allowing democracy to develop. That led to a
continued
commitment
to win, despite very evident pressures.
•
The
effectiveness of the US and Iraqi surges.
•
The Sunni
Awakening movement, and the Sunni reconciliation initiative
started
by Lt Gen
Lamb (see Section 9.5): “one of the key factors why
Reconciliation
with the
Sunni worked, was that it was initiated, negotiated and delivered
from
a position
of strength … Against that background, the MND(SE)
Reconciliation/
Accommodation
with JAM in Basra in 2007 may be perceived to have
been
completed
from a position of relative weakness.”
•
The JAM
national cease-fire which had allowed political and security
strength
and
legitimacy to accrue, over time, to the Iraqi Government and
ISF.
•
The scale
of the resources committed (in particular the US
contribution).
•
Time,
because: “All
COIN [counter-insurgency]
campaigns
take time.”
•
Strong
leadership on both the civilian and military sides of the coalition
and
within the
Iraqi government and security forces.
•
US
development of counter-insurgency doctrine, and its understanding
of the
nature of
the conflict, which had been “hugely impressive”: “Meanwhile, in
2009,
the UK has
yet to update and publish its own doctrine on COIN operations
–
a serious
omission.”
•
Co-ordination
across the various lines of operation within the US
system:
“There are
powerful lessons here for the UK cross-Government approach
to
future
campaigns and post-conflict reconstruction.”
371.
Lt Gen Cooper
observed that relations between the UK and Iraq had “warmed
a
little in
the past four months” though he was frustrated that the UK had yet
to confirm the
nature,
scale and resource of its long-term military relationship with
Iraq, particularly with
the Iraqi
armed forces. The Iraqi MOD was very keen to establish links. Lt
Gen Cooper
wrote:
“Thus far we have promised something but not yet delivered
it.”
444