3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
•
“Keeping
the oil price high (though not extreme) and avoiding a
post‑conflict
collapse”
was a key Russian interest.
•
Russia was
“not trying any” political initiatives. It seemed to have “put
some
pressure”
on Iraq, but relations were “not warm”.
796.
Sir Roderic
advised that Russia would:
“… tuck in
behind the French and Germans in the Security Council, with
the
Chinese,
but not lead the pack. They’ll support more time for inspections,
calls
for proof
positive, and ploys to get Saddam to concede or step
down.
“They will
not veto in isolation; probably not veto in Chinese company alone;
and in
general
will do all they can to avoid vetoing. They would rather let
through (perhaps
on
abstention) a distasteful second UNSCR than see the Americans go
unilaterally
and
sideline the Security Council. They would vote in favour of a
‘smoking gun’
resolution
and in favour or abstain (depending on the French vote) on a
resolution
based on
reports from Blix of non‑co‑operation.
“… It would
be awkward but not completely impossible for Putin
domestically
to be more
US‑friendly in a vote than … [Germany or France].
“… If the
US goes unilateral, the Russians will make a decent show of
grumbling …
but they
won’t be actively obstructive.”
797.
Sir Roderic
concluded that the UK approach should be: “More of the
same.”
The UK
“should help the Americans to keep the Russians engaged, including
on
day after
issues”. This meant continuing conversations with Russians,
including with
President Putin
and Mr Igor Ivanov. The “bottom line” was that President Putin
would
not want:
“… to lose
the chips he’s staked on Bush. Iraq versus the USA is a no
brainer.
(Nor does
Putin wish to part company with us, in the run‑up to his State
Visit.)”
798.
Mr Straw
told Mr Igor Ivanov that the question of a material breach
was
for the
Security Council or individual members. He accepted that resolution
1441
had not set
a timetable for inspections.
799.
The record of
Mr Igor Ivanov’s telephone call to Mr Straw on the
afternoon of
30 January
reported that Mr Ivanov had said it was necessary to address
the problems
identified
in Dr Blix’s report, but he saw no problems which could not be
resolved
264
Telegram 19
FCO London to Moscow, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with
Russian
Foreign Minister, 30 January’.
143