The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

568. Sir Michael Wood drew the Inquiry’s attention to the “American compromise

language” handed over in New York by Ambassador Negroponte to Sir Jeremy

Greenstock.181 It stated that the Security Council would:

“… convene immediately, upon receipt of a report … [of a breach] in order to

consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all the relevant Security

Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security.”

569. That paragraph remained virtually unchanged throughout the rest of the negotiation

and became OP12 of resolution 1441.

570. Before a meeting planned for 17 October, Mr Straw sent a handwritten letter

to Mr Blair addressing the differences of view within the US Administration.182

571. Mr Straw wrote that Mr Blair should read the record of his conversation with

Secretary Powell, which would give him a “flavour of the intense and dangerous

arguments in the Administration”.

572. In response to Mr Blair’s question about whether Secretary Powell was “winning”,

Mr Straw wrote that “he should win in the end”, but Mr Blair had a critical role to play.

Mr Straw advised that Mr Blair now needed “to give some clear messages” to President

Bush that:

“… we’ll have to settle for a two resolution approach; that it is safe to do so; and

that the non‑UN approach being pushed by Cheney et al would be a catastrophe for

the US, and whatever your personal sentiment, not something where you would get

support, still less obtain legal authority. In other words, you need to tell him that you

have politics too. At present, partly because they are mesmerised with your standing

in British politics, they (White House) take your support for any US position for

granted. This (a) is to misread your position (b) weakens people like Powell.”

573. Mr Straw concluded:

“David and I can work up a good case for two resolutions to put to Bush – not a

climb‑down or a wimp‑out, but a way of squaring – and then cornering Chirac –

by a private deal with him on the second resolution.”

574. Sir David Manning spoke twice to Dr Rice on 16 October.

575. In the first conversation they discussed possible wording for the draft resolution

which avoided conceding that the Security Council would “decide” on the action to be

taken in the event of a report of a serious breach by Iraq and leave the question of a

decision ambiguous.183

181 Statement, 15 March 2011, page 8, quoting Telegram 1983 UKMIS New York to FCO London,

16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: US Compromises and UK Intervention’.

182 Letter (handwritten) Straw to Prime Minister, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: US’.

183 Letter Manning to McDonald, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

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