The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

166.  After recess, Mr Brown would want to make a statement setting out “the way ahead

for overwatch and thereafter, this should focus not just on our military engagement but

look at the shape of our overall relationship with Iraq, covering the diplomatic, economic

and development aspects”.

167.  To do so would require detailed work, but Mr McDonald “stressed the sensitivity of

any discussions, including with the US, in advance of the Petraeus/Crocker testimony”

and instructed that departments “should not actively take forward any work on our

post‑PIC military presence” other than exploring “economic deliverables”.

168.  Officials in the MOD provided advice to Mr Browne on 3 August, setting out the

same background and proposals as in the submission to Mr Richmond and Mr Miliband

on 4 July.73 They said that an early meeting with Gen Petraeus had indicated the

proposal would be a “hard sell” to the US. Gen Petraeus had asked for the views of

Lt Gen Odierno before reaching a view on the proposal himself. The MOD judged that

“Gen Petraeus will need to be persuaded that this initiative will contribute to the longer

term security of Basra rather than being a short-term fix”.

169.  The advice said that in return for the cease-fire, JAM1 wanted four higher

risk detainees (two of whom were suspected of involvement in the deaths of British

personnel) released, plus a suspension of strike operations against JAM in MND(SE).

Officials asked Mr Browne to agree that MND(SE) should continue to pursue

this initiative, the first stage of which would be to raise the matter with senior US

commanders and Iraqi Government Ministers in Baghdad, with the aim of obtaining

their agreement:

“If US commanders and the Iraqi Government agree in principle, further advice will

be submitted to ministers before any releases take place.”

170.  On 4 August, Mr Browne gave his agreement over the telephone and two days

later his Private Secretary confirmed it in writing, noting that further advice would be

submitted before any releases took place.74

171.  The MCNS discussed Basra briefly on 5 August.75 Mr Abdul Qader, the Iraqi

Defence Minister, gave Prime Minister Maliki a detailed report of his visit to Basra the

previous week. He had been impressed by good co-ordination between Gen Mohan and

Maj Gen Jalil, who were making a positive impact on the security situation and who were

“enforcing law and order on the streets”.

172.  Gen Petraeus’s brief for the MCNS meeting was reported to have predicted a date

in November for transition to PIC in Basra. Governor Waili remained the “sticking point”.

73  Minute Vincent to APS2/SofS [MOD], 3 August 2007, ‘Negotiations with Jaysh Al Mehdi (JAM) in Basra’.

74  Minute Haughton to DJC-AD Pol1, 6 August 2007, ‘Negotiations with Jaysh and Mehdi (JAM) in Basra’.

75  eGram 33092/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 6 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Ministerial Committee on National

Security, 5 August’.

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