3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
backing of
international law, or the support of the majority of the British
people”, Mr Blair
replied:
“… let us
wait and see what happens in the coming weeks in relation to the
United
Nations …
[I]t is right that we are prepared to take action if necessary …
because
weapons of
mass destruction – the proliferation of … weapons and ballistic
missile
technology
… are a real threat to the security of the world and this country
…. [W]e
have to
deal with North Korea, but that is not a reason for failing to deal
with Iraq.
“The truth
is that this issue of weapons of mass destruction is a real threat
to the
world. I
believe … that it is only a matter of time before it is linked with
international
terrorism.
Does anyone believe that, if we do not take a stand … now in
respect of
weapons of
mass destruction, some terrorist group is not in future going to
get hold
of that
material and use it.
...
“This is a
difficult time. I understand the concerns that some people have,
but
sometimes
the job of a Prime Minister is to say the things that others do not
want
them to say
but we believe are necessary to say because the threat is real and
if
we do
not deal with it the consequences of weakness will haunt future
generations.”
527.
Other points
made by Mr Blair included that, if Saddam Hussein wanted to
avoid
conflict,
he could “comply with the UN resolution, co‑operate with the
inspectors, tell
us where
this material is, and have it destroyed as it should be. Conflict
would then
be avoided
… The choice is now for Saddam.”
528.
Sir David
Manning was assured by Dr Rice on 15 January that the US
would
not take
any further action with the Security Council until after the
planned
meeting
between Mr Blair and President Bush at the end of
January.
529.
Sir David
told Dr Rice that public opinion had to be convinced that
the
inspections
process was serious and had produced serious evidence.
The
UK needed
timelines for decisions no earlier than March or
April.
530.
Sir David
Manning spoke to Dr Rice on 15 January.183
531.
In the context
of a visit to Washington by Dr Blix the previous day,
Sir David and
Dr Rice
discussed the relationship between the timelines for inspections
set out in
resolutions
1284 (1999) and the requirements of resolution 1441. Sir David
thought
that the
issue could be “finessed”; and suggested that, when they met on
17 January,
Mr Blair
might encourage Dr Blix to report to the Security Council “at
regular intervals”
about
Saddam Hussein’s compliance. Although that “was not stipulated in
the
183
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
95