17  |  Civilian casualties

74.  Mr Sudad Hamoudi concluded that there had to be “some kind of accountability” for

the loss of civilian lives.

75.  An MOD official provided Mr Ingram with a draft reply to Mr Sudad Hamoudi’s letter

on 20 June.60 The official advised that further analysis of the attack suggested that the

damage to Mr Abed Hamoudi’s house had not been caused by one of the two bombs

that had missed their target, as had been suggested in the 23 April minute to Mr Ingram,

but had instead been “an unavoidable consequence of an accurate strike on the target

house”. The official continued:

“The targeting planning process identified that collateral damage was likely in

neighbouring properties to the target area. If the Hamoudi house was one of these,

it therefore seems possible it was damaged as an expected and unavoidable

consequence of the strike on the building believed to contain General ‘Chemical’

Ali Hassan Al‑Majid, although at the moment we cannot say this with certainty.

“Although we can say with complete certainty that the Hamoudi house was not

deliberately targeted by the Coalition … it becomes difficult in this particular instance

to sustain with any confidence the line that this was an accident.”

76.  The MOD official stated that there was nevertheless no doubt as to the legitimacy

of the attack.

77.  The official also stated: “In line with previous operations we would not expect to offer

compensation for damages resulting from legitimate targeting during hostilities.”

78.  Mr Ingram replied to Mr Sudad Hamoudi on 23 June.61 He reiterated his sorrow at

the deaths caused by the attack and set out the UK Government’s position on its legality:

“As the Commander of the Southern Region [of Iraq] … Al‑Majid was a key Iraqi

military figure whose removal from command was expected to deliver considerable

military advantage … thus ultimately minimising casualties on both sides. The attack

on the place where he was believed to be located was therefore entirely lawful.”

79.  Mr Ingram was advised on 10 July – over three months after the attack – that the

UK’s “research” into the incident remained “incomplete, and the information available

ambiguous”.62 PJHQ was trying to confirm the address of Mr Hamoudi’s house, and

that the strike on Gen Al‑Majid was “actually accurate and directed against the correct

co‑ordinates”.

80.  Members of the Iraq Inquiry Committee met members of the Hamoudi family

in 2010.

60  Minute MOD [junior official] to APS/Mr Ingram, 20 June 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Hamoodi Family:

Civilian Fatalities’.

61  Letter Ingram to Hamoodi, 23 June 2003, [untitled].

62  Minute MOD [junior official] to MOD [junior official], 10 July 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Hamoodi family:

civilian fatalities’.

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