The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
192.
In his
extended interview on the BBC’s
Breakfast with
Frost programme
on
26 January
(see Section 3.6), Mr Blair set out in detail his position on
Iraq.83
193.
Asked whether
Dr Blix should be given more time, Mr Blair stated that
the
inspectors
had “to be given the time to do the job”, but there was “confusion”
about
what that
job was. The time they needed was to certify whether Saddam Hussein
was
“fully
co-operating or not”. Saddam Hussein had to provide information on
“exactly what
weapons
material” he had, “allowing the inspectors to inspect it, monitor
it and shut it
down”. If
they were not able to do that job, Saddam Hussein would have to be
disarmed
by force.
That should not take months, but Saddam Hussein was not
co-operating.
194.
Pressed as to
whether non-compliance rather than evidence of weapons of
mass
destruction
justified “a war”, Mr Blair replied that he “profoundly”
disagreed with the idea
that a
refusal to co-operate was of a “lesser order”. He
added:
“… what we
know is that he has this material … we know there is something
like
350 tonnes
of chemical warfare agent. We know there is something like
30,000
special
munitions for the delivery of chemical and biological
weapons.
“He hasn’t
even told us where those old leftovers from 1998 are … we know …
that
there is an
elaborate process … of concealment …
“… [T]he
people that the inspectors want to interview … are being told, by
the Iraqi
authorities,
they can only come for interviews with an Iraqi … minder, and only
be
interviewed
in certain places.
“And we
know also from intelligence that these people’s families are being
told that if
they
co-operate and give any information at all they will be
executed.
“… [I]f he
fails to co-operate in being honest and he is pursuing a programme
of
concealment,
that is every bit as much a breach as finding, for example, a
missile or
chemical
agent.”
195.
Asked whether
there would be “another dossier” setting out what UK
intelligence
had
discovered, Mr Blair stated:
“… we have
the intelligence that says that Saddam has continued to develop
these
weapons of
mass destruction; that what he’s doing is using a whole lot of
dual-use
facilities
in order to manufacture chemical and biological weapons; and … that
there
is an
elaborate programme of concealment … forcing the inspectors to play
a game
of hide and
seek.”
196.
Asked if he
had sufficient evidence to back action, Mr Blair
replied:
“… I’ve got
no doubt at all that he’s developing these weapons and that he
poses a
threat but
we made a choice to go down the UN route …
83
BBC
News, 26
January 2003, Breakfast
with Frost.
328