10.3  |  Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and stabilisation policy

reported that with CPA officials, the group had discussed “the need to get a procurement

expert into the CPA quickly (not least to ensure not all contracts go to US firms)”.

659.  TPUK seconded a procurement officer to the CPA in August:

“… to ensure that DFI [Development Fund for Iraq] and Iraqi Ministry procurement

meets international procurement standards. Our aim is to create a level playing

field for UK companies in the DFI, then help to give them a competitive advantage

through support and advice from TPUK.”390

660.  On 10 and 11 August, Basra experienced severe rioting.391 Section 10.1 describes

the UK’s assessment of the causes of that disturbance, and its response.

661.  Representatives of Siemens’ Washington office met officials from the British

Embassy Washington on 14 August.392 The Embassy reported to the DTI:

“Siemens report a favourable change in CPA attitudes to their participation in the

power sector, which they attribute to HMG teamwork on their behalf in London,

Baghdad and Washington. The crisis in Basra over fuel and electricity may also have

tipped the balance in their favour.”

662.  Mr Gregor Lusty, Head of the DTI’s Iraq Unit, commented to DTI colleagues on

that report:

“Siemens has turned out to be quite a success story after all. A good indication of

the level of political support which may be needed to unblock the US system, and

the level of determination to get business success in Iraq.”393

663.  On 14 August, Mr Blair appointed Mr Brian Wilson as his Special Representative

on Trade Opportunities for British Business.394 Mr Wilson’s remit was to:

• support BTI in identifying and developing opportunities for British business

to help rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq and Afghanistan; and

• support BTI’s work in helping British business to invest in the energy sector.

664.  Mr Wilson had previously been the Minister for Energy and Construction.

665.  Mr Wilson met Sir Stephen Brown, TPUK Chief Executive, and senior TPUK

officials on 4 September to discuss the practicalities of the appointment.395 They agreed

that the priority “was clearly Iraq”, where Mr Blair had asked departments to raise

their game.

390 Paper TPUK, 3 September 2003, ‘Iraq Action Plan’.

391 Telegram 114 IraqRep to FCO London, 12 August 2003, ‘Situation in Basra’.

392 Telegram 3 Washington to DTI London, 15 August 2003, ‘British Commercial Interests in Iraq:

Follow‑up’.

393 Email Lusty to TPUK [junior official], 19 August 2003, ‘British Commercial Interests in Iraq: Follow-up’.

394 PA News, 14 August 2003, Special Representative for British business abroad.

395 Email Tibber to Gallagher, 5 September 2003, ‘Brian Wilson’.

473