10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
221.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed post-conflict issues at Camp David
on
222.
In advance of
the meeting, Mr Straw’s Private Office sent Mr Rycroft a
negotiating
brief for
what was to become resolution 1483, the resolution defining the
roles of the UN
and the
Coalition in post-conflict Iraq.119
223.
The
negotiating brief, prepared by the IPU, identified five “key
issues” on which US
and UK
positions differed, including the arrangements for dealing with
Iraqi oil revenues:
“Some in
the US are … tempted to arrogate to themselves charge of the
direction
of a Trust
Fund for Iraqi oil and other revenues, which will be used for
meeting the
costs of
their administration of Iraq as well as for reconstruction … this
will open
them (and
by association us) to criticism that they are reneging on their
promise
to devote
the oil revenues exclusively to the Iraqis.”
224.
Such a
proposition had “nil chance” of approval by the Security
Council:
“Either the
UN or the Iraqis themselves (perhaps with World Bank/IMF help)
must
be seen to
be in control of Iraqi revenues – certainly not the
Coalition.”
225.
The brief
concluded that, overall, the US approach amounted to:
“… asking
the UNSC [Security Council] to endorse Coalition military control
over
Iraq’s
transitional administration, its representative institutions and
its revenues until
such time
as a fully-fledged Iraqi government is ready to take
over.”
226.
The brief set
out a number of “propositions” which the IPU hoped Mr Blair
and
President
Bush would agree, including:
“The UN or
the Iraqis, not the Coalition, should manage oil
revenues.”
227.
Also as
briefing for the meeting, Mr Straw sent Mr Blair an FCO
paper on Phase IV
228.
The FCO
advised that, on oil sector management, the US and UK agreed that
the
“overarching
principles” were:
•
disruption
to the flow of Iraqi oil should be minimised;
•
Iraq’s oil
wealth should be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people;
and
118
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 28 March 2003, Prime Minister’s Meeting with
President Bush at Camp
David:
Dinner on 26 March’.
119
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington:
Iraq: UN Security Council
Resolution
on Phase IV’ attaching Paper Iraq Planning Unit, 25 March 2003,
‘Iraq: Phase IV: Authorising
UNSCR’.
120
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 25 March 2003, ‘Camp David: Post-Iraq
Policies’ attaching Paper FCO,
25 March
2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Issues’.
407