4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
645.
The Assessment
stated:
“The JIC’s
judgements on Iraq’s production, retention and the availability of
chemical
and
biological agents in 2002/3 cannot currently be
substantiated.”
646.
In an “open
discussion” of the lessons learned on Iraq in the JIC on 9
February
2006, the
minutes record that the following points were made:
“i. the
more important a subject became, the more rigorously checks and
balances
needed to
be applied to JIC product;
ii. peer
review of work was vital for some, but not all Assessments. This
was
particularly
so when, in fast changing situations, the JIC was subject to an
upward
pressure of
increased intelligence flow and a downward pressure of demand
from
senior
readers; and
iii. it was
vital that the knowledge base within the Assessments Staff was not
allowed
to atrophy
in lower priority subject areas …”261
647.
Iraq was
undoubtedly a difficult intelligence target and the UK had
no
sources of
human intelligence with reliable first-hand knowledge of Iraq’s
WMD
capabilities
or Saddam Hussein’s intentions.
648.
The ISC stated
that Iraq was a hard target but SIS “successfully ran a number
of
agents
against Iraq and Saddam’s regime” who “provided intelligence over a
wide range
of topics,
although the SIS acknowledged that coverage on some subjects was
stronger
649.
The ISC
described the SIS process of issuing intelligence reports in
the
following terms:
“The SIS
collects human intelligence (HUMINT) when agents, who can also
be
known as
sources, report back to their case officer. Sources either operate
on
their own
or quote a sub-source, who may be quoting another sub-source of
their
own. After
a meeting or communication between agent and [SIS] case officer,
the
information
is checked by the SIS who, after consulting experts as necessary,
issue
an
intelligence report. This report contains the information provided
by the agent
(who by
definition is the single source for the information) and an
assessment
of the
reliability of the agent and any sub-sources, as appropriate,
together with
SIS
comments. The SIS comments will refer the reader of the report to
any other
261
Minutes, 9
February 2005, JIC meeting.
262
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 32.
405