9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
attacks,
indirect fire attacks and effective attacks were all at the highest
level for six
months.
199.
In a phone
conversation with President Bush on 29 September Mr Blair said
that
the US and
UK should be clear in public messages that developments in Iraq
were
a direct
result of “our opponents’ strategy” not policy
failures.125
In Iraq it
was AQ and
Iran who
were driving the violence: “If we succeeded in our aims, this would
be a blow
to them.”
200.
On 5 October,
at the request of the FCO, the JIC assessed the performance of
the
Iraqi
Government, its level of popular support and its prospects over the
year ahead.126
201.
The JIC judged
that after five months in office:
“… the
faction‑based Iraqi Government is proving ineffective …
Co‑ordination
between and
within Government Ministries is poor. None of this looks likely
to
improve in
the near future. Meanwhile, sectarian and insurgent violence is at
a
record
high, and fuel, water and electricity shortages persist across much
of the
country.”
202.
The JIC
assessed that Prime Minister Maliki’s approach to security
was
“governed
by the critical need to maintain Shia support”. He wanted a
political solution
to
disbanding militia groups and was “deeply sceptical of
Multi‑National Force (MNF)
proposals
for tough military action against Shia groups”.
203.
The JIC
recorded “little success so far” on the national reconciliation
plan, and
assessed
that:
“Against a
backdrop of worsening security, Sunni Government Ministers are
feeling
increasingly
marginalised and unable to exert influence, while some leading
Shia
and Kurdish
political figures are questioning the Sunnis’ commitment to
ending
violence.
Mutual distrust is growing.”
204.
Security was
judged to be the greatest challenge facing the Iraqi Government,
with
the
restoration of order in Baghdad a key issue:
“In the
medium term, politically divisive issues such as federalism, the
review of the
Constitution
and the future of Kirkuk, have the potential to capsize the
Government;
they can be
managed or deferred at most for 12‑18 months.”
125
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 29 September 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s Secure Call
with President Bush,
29
September: Middle East Issues’.
126
JIC
Assessment, 5 October 2006, ‘Al‑Maliki’s Government: Interim
Progress Report’.
41