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9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007
attacks, indirect fire attacks and effective attacks were all at the highest level for six
months.
199.  In a phone conversation with President Bush on 29 September Mr Blair said that
the US and UK should be clear in public messages that developments in Iraq were
a direct result of “our opponents’ strategy” not policy failures.125 In Iraq it was AQ and
Iran who were driving the violence: “If we succeeded in our aims, this would be a blow
to them.”
October 2006
200.  On 5 October, at the request of the FCO, the JIC assessed the performance of the
Iraqi Government, its level of popular support and its prospects over the year ahead.126
201.  The JIC judged that after five months in office:
“… the faction‑based Iraqi Government is proving ineffective … Co‑ordination
between and within Government Ministries is poor. None of this looks likely to
improve in the near future. Meanwhile, sectarian and insurgent violence is at a
record high, and fuel, water and electricity shortages persist across much of the
country.”
202.  The JIC assessed that Prime Minister Maliki’s approach to security was
“governed by the critical need to maintain Shia support”. He wanted a political solution
to disbanding militia groups and was “deeply sceptical of Multi‑National Force (MNF)
proposals for tough military action against Shia groups”.
203.  The JIC recorded “little success so far” on the national reconciliation plan, and
assessed that:
“Against a backdrop of worsening security, Sunni Government Ministers are feeling
increasingly marginalised and unable to exert influence, while some leading Shia
and Kurdish political figures are questioning the Sunnis’ commitment to ending
violence. Mutual distrust is growing.”
204.  Security was judged to be the greatest challenge facing the Iraqi Government, with
the restoration of order in Baghdad a key issue:
“In the medium term, politically divisive issues such as federalism, the review of the
Constitution and the future of Kirkuk, have the potential to capsize the Government;
they can be managed or deferred at most for 12‑18 months.”
125  Letter Banner to Hayes, 29 September 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s Secure Call with President Bush,
29 September: Middle East Issues’.
126  JIC Assessment, 5 October 2006, ‘Al‑Maliki’s Government: Interim Progress Report’.
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