The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
61.
In preparation
for a telephone call to Dr Blix on 10 March, Mr Rycroft
advised
Mr Blair
that he could not allow the proposals for tests to be watered down
and that
initial
tests would show whether there was a change of heart to allow full
co-operation.21
Mr Blair
might need to remind Dr Blix that his 7 March report had noted
that Iraq should
be able to
provide more documentary evidence; and that where documents were
not
available,
interviews could be another way to obtain evidence.
62.
Mr Blair
told Dr Blix that “the only way to avoid immediate conflict
and allow more
time for
inspections was to lay down a set of tests … If these were met, we
could
establish a
future work programme.”22
He did not
know if the US would agree the
approach
and could try to “extend the 17 March deadline a bit”.
63.
In the
discussion of the possible tests, Dr Blix noted that it would
not be possible
for Iraq to
“yield up” all its WMD by 17 March, as proposed in the draft
resolution.
The proposed
test on anthrax would also be difficult. He suggested the addition
of the
complete
destruction of Al Samoud missiles.
64.
Dr Blix
wrote that he had been invited to the UK Permanent Mission to the
UN in
New York to
take a call from Mr Blair at 1.30pm London
time.23
Mr Blair
had said “they
needed five
or six items on which the Iraqis would demonstrate their compliance
with
UNMOVIC’s
work programme”. The items the UK had been considering
“included
accounting
for anthrax, the chemical agents VX and mustard, SCUD missiles
and
remotely
piloted vehicles: and promising genuine co-operation with UNMOVIC’s
plans
to take
scientists (along with their families) for interviews outside
Iraq”.
65.
Dr Blix
wrote that: “The process could not go on until April/May but
perhaps it could
extend a
few days beyond March 17.”
66.
Dr Blix
added that he had told Mr Blair that all the “items” he had
mentioned would
fall within
the list of unresolved disarmament issues, but: “Whether they would
all be
among the
key issues we would select, I could not yet say with
certainty.”
67.
Dr Blix
commented that he had “sensed” that Mr Blair had “found it
hard to
persuade
the US to go along”.
68.
Mr Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons
on
10 March
that the choice lay between standing firm and giving Saddam
Hussein
a deadline
for compliance or a return to the “failed policy” of
containment.
69.
Mr Straw
made an oral statement to the House of Commons on 10 March
in
which he
described the reports to the Security Council on 7 March by
Dr Blix and
21
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 10 March 2003, ‘Blix Call’.
22
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Blix, 10
March’.
23
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc, 2005.
412