6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
be
involved, both in mandating any stabilisation and reconstruction
activities and in
overseeing
them.
“…
Unexpectedly, the FCO have just decided that they wish to seek the
Foreign
Secretary’s
approval for the general line they wish to take in discussion …
that we
should be
pressing the US to follow a UN rather than a unilateral US-led
route, in
dealing
with day-after issues. The FCO take the line that any unilateral US
plan
would lack
international legitimacy, and that without an agreed Coalition
approach
the legal
basis on which our own forces might operate would be at best
unclear and
possibly
unsafe.”
41.
Mr Pollard
stated that there was “some force” in the FCO argument and
that
Mr Ian Lee,
MOD Director General Operational Policy (DG OpPol), was content
to
take part
in the Washington talks on that basis.
42.
Mr Pollard
advised that the FCO was likely to brief Mr Straw to follow up
the talks
with
Secretary Powell and was also expected to put post-conflict issues
on the agenda
for
Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush on 31 January. The MOD
would be closely
associated
with the drafting of that advice. Mr Lee would advise on his
return from
Washington
whether Mr Hoon should raise the issue in his weekly telephone
call to
Mr Donald
Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense.
43.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary (PUS),19
commented
separately
to
Mr Hoon:
“My main
observation on what is a good paper is that this rather underplays
the
fissiparous
tendencies within Iraq and the risk that groups are as likely to
fight each
other as
Coalition forces. More detailed work is needed in my view on how to
keep
Kurds,
Turkomans, Shia, Sunni and, perhaps Southern Marsh Shia together in
one
national
entity – and indeed to handle those other three groups – people
bent on
revenge
against S[addam] H[ussein]’s regime relics, and the
outsiders/exiles who
may find
themselves less welcome than they expect. All points to the need
for a very
strong
initial security presence, with a clear link to the political
reform process. A still
stronger
case in my view for the US to want a wider Coalition, made possible
under
19
In keeping
with variations in use within departments, the Inquiry refers to
the most senior civil servant
in the FCO
and the MOD as the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), but in all
other departments as the
Permanent
Secretary. The Permanent Under Secretaries and Permanent
Secretaries are referred to
collectively
as Permanent Secretaries.
20
Manuscript
comment Tebbit on Minute Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 17
January 2003,
‘Iraq: Day‑After
Issues’.
317