The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
197.
The official
noted the importance of getting this right so as to maintain
momentum,
which might
be lost if it was necessary to try and seek the views of all
stakeholders at
each
stage:
“[We also
need to] consider what next steps we will propose. Part of this
will be
giving
thought to which of [JAM1]’s 16 detainees we would consider
releasing and
which not.
If [JAM1] delivers and we see a significant decrease in IDF, it
will be
important
that we are able to deliver a suitable reward/incentive to him in
the form
of further
releases … Similarly, if [JAM1] is less-than-successful in
delivering a
cease-fire
and requests more detainee releases, how will we tweak our
proposals
accordingly?”
198.
The day after
they were released, government officials working closely with
the
military
reported that two of the former detainees gave radio interviews in
Basra.91
One
interview was believed to have been fairly “banal” but in the other
the individual
suggested
that releases were part of a cease-fire agreement.
199.
On 15 August,
the same officials sent a note to JAM1 saying that they
considered
it unwise
for the released individuals to be adopting a media profile and
asking “please
could they
tone it down a bit”. A telephone conversation with JAM1 followed,
in which
he agreed
that media appearances were not helpful and would advise “that they
should
exercise
discretion”. The officials told JAM1 that there had been one IDF
attack on Basra
Palace the
previous night, to which MND(SE) had responded. JAM1 was surprised
at
the attack
and acknowledged that the response was within the terms of the
agreement.
200.
Maj Gen Shaw
completed his posting as GOC MND(SE) on 14 August.
Looking
back over
his seven-month tour in his last weekly update, he identified the
death
of Basra
JAM commander Wissam Al Qadir on 25 May as a turning point
(see
Section 9.5).92
After this
point, JAM became “leaderless” and went into 40 days’
mourning.
At the same time, there was a troop rotation within
MND(SE):
“The
enforced lull on both MNF and JAM coincided with the arrival of an
Iraqi
[General
Mohan] with wasta
[clout] …
and contacts in OMS [Office of the Matyr
Sadr]/JAM
who shared our vision of how to resolve the Basra security
problem:
re‑task
nationalist JAM violence away from MNF towards Iran. This political
dynamic
has set the
context for … operations which have continued … to buy Mohan
space
to work on
nationalist JAM. Our predicted move from BP by the end of the month
…
is
consistent with Mohan’s drive to clarify Iraqi nationalist loyalty.
This sets the scene
for my
successor, with Basra de
facto PIC’d, us
firmly in support.”
91
Email
government official working closely with the military, 15 August
2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]
Developments
15 Aug 07’.
92
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 14 August 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 14
August 2007’.
220