8 | The
invasion
125.
Gen Reith
added that that had not really been a factor other than for 3
Commando
Brigade
which had:
“… hit a
couple of small pockets of resistance which were Special
Republican
Guard.
“By and
large … we were dealing with … conventional divisions … many of
them
just broke
up and disappeared.”
126.
The
redeployment of elements of the Republican Guard to stiffen Iraqi
defences
in the
South had not been predicted by the JIC.
127.
The
assessments made pre-conflict about the conventional capabilities
of Iraq’s
Security
Forces and their actions and intentions in response to an invasion
are set out
in Section
6.2.
128.
The assessment
of the operational risks from forces deployed in the South is
set
out in the
Box below.
A JIC
Assessment of 6 December 2002 considered Iraq’s options “during a
coalition
ground
attack”.76
The
Assessment described Iraq’s naval capability as “very limited”,
but
said that
it “could lay a credible minefield along the Iraqi coast”. It did
not specifically
address
Iraq’s potential response to an amphibious assault, including
mining the beaches.
The
campaign plan for Operation Desert Storm in 1991 did not involve
amphibious landings.77
The advice
to Mr Hoon and Mr Blair is set out in Section
6.1.
The MOD
advice to Mr Hoon in December 2002 identified a potential
threat to maritime
forces from
Iraqi forces defending the al-Faw Peninsula, and stated that the US
plan was
designed to
prevent reinforcements being attempted. If reinforcement was
attempted,
“Coalition
Forces should be able to defeat it with ease”.78
There was
no consideration of
the
likelihood of Iraq mining the beaches to hamper an amphibious
landing.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, identified the need for an
assessment
which set
out the operational risks of the role proposed for the Royal Marine
Commando
Group in a
clear and balanced way.79
The papers
sent to No.10 by the MOD on 12 December did not address likely
Iraqi
76
JIC
Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Options’.
77
Ministry of
Defence, Statement
on the Defence Estimates – Britain’s Defence for the
90s,
1991,
Cm 1559-I.
Pages 21-24.
78
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq
Military Planning: Amphibious
Task
Group’.
79
Manuscript
comment Tebbit on Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11
December 2002,
‘Iraq
Military Planning: Amphibious Task Group’.
80
Letter
Williams to Manning, 12 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning –
Amphibious Task Group
(ATG)’.
23