The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to Islam
… Saddam Hussein had attacked his own people and his neighbours –
all
of whom
were Muslims.”
247.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Blair said:
“… the
strategy based on the United Nations route was clear, although
the
uncertainties
loomed large and there was a natural reluctance to go to war. It
was
to be
expected that the public would want the inspectors to find the
evidence before
military
action was taken. Pursuing the United Nations route was the right
policy, but
we should
not rule out the possibility of military action without a second
resolution.
The
priorities for the immediate future were:
•
improved
communications, which would set out the Government’s strategy
and
be promoted
by the whole Cabinet;
•
preparatory
work on planning the aftermath of any military action and the role
of
the United
Nations in that, which should in turn be conveyed to the Iraqi
people
so that
they had a vision of a better life in prospect; and
•
contingency
work on the unintended consequences which could arise
from
the Iraqi
use of weapons of mass destruction, environmental catastrophe
or
internecine
strife within Iraq.”
248.
Ms Adams sent
Sir Jeremy Greenstock a copy of Lord Goldsmith’s draft
advice,
stating
that it indicated the view he had “provisionally formed regarding
the interpretation
of the
resolution”; and that:
“The
Attorney would welcome your comments on the view he has
reached.
In particular,
he would be interested to know if you feel that there are any
significant
arguments
which he has overlooked which would point to a different
conclusion.
The note
has been passed by the Attorney to No.10, but has not been
circulated more
widely. I
have been asked to stress that the note should not be copied
further.”93
249.
In preparation
for a meeting between Sir Jeremy and Mr Blair on 23 January
to
discuss
negotiation of a second resolution and related issues,
Mr Rycroft told Mr Blair
that Sir
Jeremy would explore Mr Blair’s “ideas” with Lord Goldsmith
later that day.94
250.
There is no
mention of the issues to be discussed with Lord Goldsmith in the
No.10
record of
the meeting with Sir Jeremy.95
93
Letter
Adams to Greenstock, 21 January 2003, ‘Meeting with the Attorney
General, 23 January’.
94
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Jeremy Greenstock’.
95
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting with Jeremy Greenstock’.
50