The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“The US and UK came under intensive criticism from all other members of the

Council, and the UN as a whole, for taking matters in their own hands in this way but

there was no formal motion of condemnation put forward.”276

696.  The military action was supported by the main political parties in the UK.

697.  Mr Blair made a statement to the House of Commons on 17 December.277 He said

that the objectives of the military operation were:

“… clear and simple: to degrade the ability of Saddam Hussein to build and use

weapons of mass destruction, including command and control and delivery systems,

and to diminish the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbours by

weakening his military capability.

“… the action is proportionate to the serious dangers Saddam Hussein poses …

The targets, throughout Iraq, have been very carefully selected to reflect these

objectives …”

698.  Other points made by Mr Blair included:

• The inspectors had been “constantly harassed, threatened, deceived and

lied to. A special and elaborate mechanism to conceal Iraqi capability was out

in place involving organisations close to Saddam, in particular his Special

Republican Guard.”

• UNSCOM had achieved a huge amount, but “too much” remained “unaccounted

for”, and Iraq had “consistently sought to frustrate attempts to look at the records

and destroy the remaining capability”.

• A report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in October 1998 had

“documented massive and extremely grave violations of human rights”.

• Saddam Hussein’s obstruction had begun “in real earnest” after “the full extent

of the weapons programme was uncovered in 1996 and early 1997”. It included

casting doubt on the independence of the inspectors and seeking to exclude US

and UK nationals.

• Saddam Hussein had been given a “last chance” in mid-November, and warned

that, if he broke his word and obstructed the work of the inspectors, “there would

be no further warnings or diplomatic arguments … we would strike”.

• Saddam Hussein was “a man to whom a last chance to do right is just a further

opportunity to do wrong. He is blind to reason.”

• Saddam Hussein’s attitude was “as much deliberate obstruction as he thought

he could get away”, which he had used “deliberately to try to blackmail the

international community into lifting sanctions”.

276  Statement, November 2009, page 1.

277  House of Commons, Official Report, 17 December 1998, columns 1097-1102.

154