6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
368.
Mr Blair
also underlined the importance of minimising civilian
casualties.
369.
The
assessments made by the Government before, and during, initial
combat
operations
of the number of Iraqi civilian casualties are addressed in Section
17.
370.
Mr Blair was
briefed on the targeting aspects of an air campaign by Mr
Hoon,
Adm Boyce
and Air Cdre Heath on 6 February.128
371.
Mr Blair
agreed “the overall strategy of the air campaign, creating an
overwhelming
effect so
that the regime collapsed or at least was disabled from using WMD
in a conflict,
leading to
the overall objective of Iraqi disarmament”. He underlined the
importance
of
“minimising the number of civilian casualties and ensuring that all
targets were
appropriate
and proportionate” and that consideration should be given to “how
best to
explain
publicly the scale and nature of the campaign”.
372.
Mr Blair asked
for a note explaining the rationale behind the targets chosen for
the
proposed
air campaign, and an assessment of the likely accuracy of the
campaign.
373.
Mr Watkins
provided that advice on 10 February.129
He wrote that
the plan was to
mount near
simultaneous attacks of air, ground and information
operations:
“The air
campaign has been crafted to ensure success … without going
beyond
what is
necessary to achieve specific military campaign objectives. It will
appear to
involve
overwhelming force – but it is not intended to turn Iraq into a
wasteland. The
targets
have been selected for the effect that their disabling or
destruction would
have on the
regime rather than to inflict physical damage. The target sets
therefore
mostly
represent only a fraction of those that could be attacked in each
category
… This
approach should minimise the number of civilian and potentially
military
casualties;
ease the issues of reconstitution in the aftermath of conflict; and
facilitate
the
earliest possible military withdrawal.”
374.
Target sets
for the air campaign included “all those facilities which would
enable
the regime
to activate and deploy WMD”.
375.
The land
campaign would begin in the first few days but precise timings were
not
known. Mr
Watkins wrote that “whether the UK brigades will become heavily
engaged
in fighting
will very much depend on the effectiveness of the air campaign and
initial
US land
operations”.
376.
The UK
shared its draft military campaign objectives with the US
in
mid- February.
128
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting, 6 February’.
129
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 10 February 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military
Campaign’.
441