10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
150.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald spoke to Dr Rice later that day, and expressed his
concern that
humanitarian
and reconstruction efforts in Fallujah had been slow to get off the
ground.82
He reported
that Dr Rice shared that concern, but thought that some
humanitarian
assistance
was now getting into the city, and “everyone was adamant” that
there was
no humanitarian
crisis.
151.
The FCO
advised No.10 on 19 November that there were “plenty of
resources
available”
for Fallujah’s reconstruction.83
The IIG’s
response was poorly co-ordinated.
The UK
would monitor the IIG’s response, and would feed in advice on the
best way to
reconstruct
houses damaged in the fighting. The UK had advised Lt Gen Kiszely
that the
most
effective approach would be to give each family a sum of money “for
them to go
and see to
the re-building themselves”. That approach, used in Kosovo, would
ensure
that the
money was ploughed back into the Fallujah economy and secure
residents’
“buy-in” to
reconstruction.
152.
In his weekly
report to Gen Walker on 21 November, Lt Gen Kiszely
advised
that
planning for reconstruction was “well developed” within the US
Embassy, led by
IRMO, but
almost none had taken place in the IIG.84
Prime
Minister Allawi was now
“cracking
the whip”, which should lead to greater Iraqi Ministerial
engagement. With so
few
inhabitants in the city, there was no humanitarian crisis, and the
“vast majority” of
displaced
people had found accommodation with extended family or friends.
There were
some small
tented camps around Fallujah, to which NGOs were delivering
supplies. The
immediate
priorities were to clarify the situation and co-ordinate activity;
in the absence
of the IIG,
that fell to MNF-I.
153.
Lt Gen Kiszely
also advised that his appointment as “MNF-I co-ordinator
for
humanitarian
assistance and reconstruction” had been prompted by Gen
Casey’s
concern
about the scale of the humanitarian and reconstruction
challenge.
154.
Lt Gen Kiszely
told the Inquiry:
“… by the
end of November/early December, it was quite clear that this
[military]
operation
was going to be successful. And the big concern for the
Americans
was what
was going to happen afterwards: was this going to be a microcosm,
if
you like,
of the campaign as a whole in which the reconstruction phase was
not
properly
planned for, or were they going to ensure that it was properly
planned
and managed?
And they very much focused on getting this right.” 85
82
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 18 November 2004, ‘Conversation with US
National Security Adviser:
18 November
2004’.
83
Letter Owen
to Phillipson, 19 November 2004, ‘Iraq: the Political Process –
Prospects for Elections
and Sharm
El-Sheikh’.
84
Minute
Kiszely to CDS, 21 November 2004, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (138) of
21 Nov 04’.
85
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, page 16.
221