12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

166.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr Hoon or those accompanying him

raised any concerns.

167.  Mr Hoon offered UK support with the training of the NIA and stated that it was

important that police reform took place in the context of a wider SSR process, “including

lawyers, judges, prison officers”.

168.  The Inquiry asked Mr Simon Webb, MOD Policy Director, about the meeting.133

Mr Webb said that he had expected the Iraqi Army to be retained and reformed but

observed:

“Of course, life then became particularly complicated when the army disappeared,

because of course Saddam [Hussein] had himself … dispersed the army so that it

couldn’t become a political threat to him. Under this … strange command structure

he had introduced in 2002, the army just … gave up and went away. So when

Walt Slocombe showed up … it seemed a bit odd to … summon the army back in

again when you knew that actually you really wanted a rather different army from

a democratisation point of view.”

169.  Mr Ian Lee, MOD Director General Operational Policy, told the Inquiry that

although he had met Mr Slocombe when the latter visited London in May 2003, he did

not recall a discussion on the disbandment of the Iraqi military.134

170.  The Chiefs of Staff met on 14 May.135 Minutes of the meeting recorded that “the

de‑Ba’athification process was anticipated to render all those officials senior to the rank

of Lieutenant Colonel as ‘out of play’”. No concerns about that were recorded, nor do

the minutes contain any mention of concern about Mr Slocombe’s plan to rebuild the

Iraqi Army from scratch.

171.  Adm Boyce told the Inquiry that he had “laid down … that we should not …

go through de‑Ba’athification or indeed disband the Iraqi Army. I saw that as being

absolutely essential for the future.”136

172.  Sir David Manning told the Inquiry about the impact of dissolving Iraqi military and

security entities:

“… these were policies that added to the difficulties, because we might have

addressed the security vacuum by trying to encourage Iraqi police, Iraqi military, to

co‑operate with us, instead of which, they are disbanded and then become natural

dissidents and potential insurgents.”137

133  Private hearing, 23 June 2010, pages 66‑68.

134  Private hearing, 22 June 2010, pages 55‑56.

135  Minutes, 14 May 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

136  Public hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 94‑95.

137  Public hearing, 30 November 2009, page 91.

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