6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
594.
On 5
September, Mr Hoon discussed the draft letter to No.10 with
Adm Boyce,
Sir Kevin Tebbit,
Lt Gen Pigott, Maj Gen Fry and Mr Ian Lee,
who had replaced
Mr Bowen
as MOD Director General Operational Policy.239
595.
The note of
the meeting recorded that they concluded there was now slightly
more
clarity on
the window for military action (then considered to be between
December 2002
and May
2003), and the possibility of a simultaneous entry into Iraq from
the north and
south. The
Chiefs of Staff were not yet in a position to determine if the US
had a winning
concept,
and were focused on the ability to mount an operation from the
north.
596.
Mr Hoon
pointed to the complication resulting from the shift in the
diplomatic
context,
which raised the question of the “necessity or otherwise to move
assets” while
the UN
process was under way “and before Parliament returned in
mid‑October”. That
“was
especially acute for Package 3”. A requirement to support Op FRESCO
“effectively
precluded
our offering a fully capable fighting division”. That meant that
the UK should
assume that
the US would deploy its 4th Infantry Division to the North. It
would be
difficult
to integrate UK forces with that Division; the Chiefs of Staff
would “consider
whether we
could offer some land force components of a larger coalition” force
in the
North. Even
Package 2 would require early decisions on UORs, including
desertisation
of
equipment.
597.
In
Mr Hoon’s view, the draft advice for No.10 underplayed “the
scale of the
contribution
provided by Package 2 and the degree of influence which it would
give us
on US
military planning”.
598.
Mr Blair
discussed the UK’s military contribution with Mr Hoon on 5
September.240
Mr Straw
was also present.
599.
Mr Watkins
recorded that Mr Blair, Mr Hoon and Mr Straw had
discussed the
packages,
and that Mr Hoon had highlighted the benefits of Package 2.
“No decisions
were taken”
and Mr Blair “did not expect President Bush to commit himself
imminently to
a military
campaign”.
600.
Mr Watkins
also recorded that Mr Hoon had met Mr Brown to discuss
the options
and alert
him to the likely costs of Package 2.
601.
There was no
No.10 record of the meeting.
602.
Mr Lee
provided a revised letter to No.10, advising caution because the
advice had
been
“assembled in a short space of time from a necessarily limited
group”.241
603.
Mr Watkins
responded that Mr Hoon had asked for the letter to be recast
to
explain
more fully why the UK was not able to offer a fully capable
division; and that the
239
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
240
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
241
Minute Lee
to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Update
for the Prime Minister’.
265