1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
“The
preferred option by far would be to implement SCR 1284, enabling
the inspectors
to return
and sanctions to be suspended. But there does not seem to be
much
prospect of
that happening any time soon. Meanwhile the human consequences
of
economic
sanctions are pretty appalling, which is bad in itself and it gives
critics an
easy point
of attack; and the pressures on Saddam are not that
great.”
63.
Mr Sawers
stated that work was under way to review the policy options, in
advance
of
discussions with the new US Administration. Mr Blair would
welcome:
“… the
Foreign Secretary’s views on the approach we should adopt, bearing
in mind
that the
first instinct of a new [US] Administration will be to seek ways to
unseat
Saddam
rather than to accommodate him”.
On 1
December, at the request of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat
(OD Sec)
and in
response to the inter-departmental policy review on Iraq, the JIC
assessed Iraq’s
The JIC
Assessment of Iraq’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities,
including whether
they
constituted a residual threat, is set out in Section 4.1. The JIC
Assessment of the
threat that
Iraq posed to its neighbours is set out below.
The JIC
stated that Iraq had lost nearly half its military strength as a
result of the Gulf
Conflict
and the capability of what remains had “declined since 1991”. UN
sanctions
had
“successfully
prevented the procurement of new weapons systems” and
had
constrained
equipment maintenance and repair.
The JIC’s
Key Judgements included:
•
A
“military
offensive outside Iraq’s borders would be limited by
shortfalls in
equipment
and logistics”.
•
“While
US/UK forces
remain deployed in
the region and prepared to intervene
militarily,
an attack
on Kuwait is very unlikely.
But if the
southern No-Fly
Zone and
no-drive zone became defunct, warning time
for an attack would
shorten …
Should deterrence fail, US/UK forces currently in the region might
be
insufficient
to defeat an Iraqi attack.”
•
“If US
and UK forces were withdrawn from the Gulf, and Saddam
perceived
that the
west was no longer prepared to intervene militarily, he could try
to
re-take
Kuwait. In such
circumstances he would succeed, even with
his
current force
levels.”
•
“To
rebuild its Armed Forces, Iraq would need military sanctions
lifted.
This is
unlikely while Saddam remains in power. But if it happened, it
would take
several
years at least before Iraq’s capabilities increased to a level
which would
alter
significantly the military balance in the region.”
41
JIC
Assessment, 1 December 2000, ‘Iraq’s Military
Capabilities’.
203